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Abstract° 
Although its importance, only recently the issue of liquidity in Treasury markets has received greater 
attention. We survey the literature about market liquidity and liquidity measures, and we put forward new 
measures. The aim is to provide a description of the liquidity of the Italian wholesale secondary market, 
which we describe thoroughly. We apply a large set of measures on a unique dataset, which gives us a 
complete view of the market. Even though the market provides an amount of liquidity that fits the market 
needs, the quality of the order book is low, and despite the presence of a large number of market makers, the 
degree of competition among them is not very high. Moreover, no clear and general relationship emerges 
between trading and order book measures. Indeed, even though trading activity is higher for on-the-run 
securities with respect to the off-the-run securities, there is not a sharp difference in terms of liquidity of the 
order book between them. In this case market regulation plays an important role. Finally, we investigate how 
long it takes for a new issue to become the benchmark for its segment. Our evidence shows that some 
modifications of the issuance policy in order to have a larger outstanding since the first auction could help 
securities in gaining earlier their benchmark status, especially in case of 10-year BTPs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In Europe, electronic transactions amount to 75 per cent of total trade volume for government 
securities. Among the wholesale markets, MTS (Mercato Telematico dei titoli di Stato) is the leading 
market in Europe for the electronic trading of fixed income securities. Within the MTS system the 
weight of Italian securities is prominent. The main aim of the present report is to measure and 
evaluate the market liquidity of MTS, by using data on the Italian market. Our results are going to 
cast additional light on an issue that has received limited attention in the literature: exceptions are 
Albanesi, Rindi (1999), Cheung, de Jong, Rindi (2005), Girardi, Piga (2207), Inoue (1999). 
 
A financial security is liquid if it can be traded in a marked without affecting its price. Despite its 
relevance, the concept of market liquidity can hardly be pinned down. Actually, it has 
multidimensional aspects and, consequently, many different measures of markets liquidity are 
available. The measures available in the literature can be separated in two main groups: Trade 
measures and order book measures. Trade measures draw on data on actual financial transactions. 
Order book measures, on the contrary, describe the characteristics of the order book of the 
proposals of transactions which are available in the market.  
 
MTS markets are an example of quote-driven electronic order book. Therefore, the quality of the 
order book is particularly relevant. In effect, the quotes on the book are firm and immediately 
executable. Therefore, the features of the order book and their evolution in time define the amount 
of liquidity provided by the market makers.  
 
The main comparative advantage of our research is the availability of high frequency data on the 
whole order book. Our dataset covers transactions and quotes of the Italian medium and long term 
government bonds being traded on the MTS platforms from January 2004 to December 2006. Our 
database contains all the “snapshots” between 8:30am and 5.30pm at a five-minute frequency. All 
the contracts are also available and they include the sign of the trade and the time of the trade. 
Transactions and quotes are available for both on-the-run and off-the-run securities, where for on-
the-run we mean the most recently auctioned security.  
 
Therefore, our preliminary and main aim was the exploitation of the data set and the presentation of 
a consistent set of indicators and measures, which could give comprehensive description of the most 
important features of order book and trading data. Drawing on the results of the descriptive, mainly 
non parametric analysis, in the last part of the paper we try to identify when, in terms of liquidity, 
an on-the-run security becomes the reference for its maturity segment, i.e. when it becomes a 
benchmark. 
 
Given the peculiarity of our database, we concentrated on the order book measures: We presented a 
new taxonomy of order book measures and put forward new measures. Order book measures can be 
classified according to three dimensions: Tightness, depth and breadth. Having compared the 
performance of a large set of liquidity indicators, we are able to indicate those that give a 
comprehensive description of the most important features of order book and trading data. Among 
tightness measures, best spread is our preferred indicator. It directly quantifies the cost of most of 
the transactions on the market, it behaves consistently with the other liquidity indicators and it is the 
most easily available liquidity indicator. Steepness, which is the main indicators of breadth, is 
crucial to understand how the MTS order book moves during the day and react to market 
conditions. The peculiar behaviour of steepness help us to figure out why best spread, spread and 
weighted spread, that is the main measures of tightness, often move in opposite directions. 
However, steepness is not consistent with the other measures of liquidity. It rises when the market 
seems to be more liquid. As to the depth of the order book, we have shown that quote size does not 
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uniformly spread out on the order book. That is why quote size has to be examined together with 
indicators of size distribution: Best size is the simplest and most easily available. Among 
multidimensional order book indicators, that is indicators which combine more than one dimension 
of our taxonomy, slope, market quality index and CRT turn up to be good synthetic indicators of 
market liquidity. Among them, slope is one of the liquidity measures originally elaborated by us 
and it combines breadth and depth. 
 
No clear and general relationship emerges between trading and order book measures. Trading 
measures can be split in two groups: The first group comprises trading volume, trading frequency, 
turnover. They either show no correlation with order book measures, or are combined with less 
liquid order book, although they convey crucial information about the working of the market. The 
second group comprises trade size and price impact coefficients. They move in the same directions 
of the other liquidity measures. However, price impact coefficients are not easily computable and 
are not available on a real-time basis. Interestingly, slope is conceptually close to price impact 
coefficient, even though the amount of data needed to calculate the latter is much larger than the 
one needed for the former. As a matter of fact, in our data the empirical values of the two indicators 
are reciprocally consistent, even though they are not weekly correlated. Slope seems to be a good 
liquidity indicator. 
 
The comparison of trade size data with best size data shows that the quantity available on the book 
at the best price seems to be adequate to the revealed trade needs of the market. Most of trading 
could occur at the best price. However, the analysis of the correlation between size measures and 
best spread casts new light on the quality of the order book and on the distribution of quote size. 
When the market becomes more liquid and quote size increases and best spread shrinks, quote size 
at the best prices falls, the order book becomes steeper and the additional quantities available for 
trade are placed at the end of the order book. In the end, even though MTS provides an amount of 
liquidity that fits the market needs, the quality of the order book is low: Most of the quote size is off 
the best quote; when the number of the market makers increases, the newcomers quoted prices that 
are far away from the best prices and make the steepness of the order book to jump. These features 
could be signalling that, despite the presence of a large number of market makers, the degree of 
competition among them is not very high. 
 
The medium and long term BTPs seem to represent the most liquid segments. The CTZs have a 
good performance in terms of best spread, but they are characterized by a more dispersed book. The 
30 year BTPs show performances that are better than expected with respect to the order book 
measures. On the other hand, trading activity in this segment is still low and only the index linked 
bonds exhibit lower figures. This latter segment is, not surprisingly, the worst in terms of most of 
the employed measures. 
 
Trading measures show a sharp difference between on-the-run and off-the-run securities. Given the 
higher trading activity recorded in the case of the on-the-run securities, a more liquid order book 
could be expected for those securities. Surprisingly, all the order book measures do not show any 
significant difference between on-the-run and off-the-run securities. The reasonable explanation of 
this evidence has to be looked for in the obligations imposed on market makers on the MTS 
platform and on the monitoring procedures of Specialists by Italian Treasury. As a consequence, the 
number of market makers in the off-the-run segment is higher than it would have been in the 
absence of obligations and monitoring, and this keeps down off-the-run spreads. Dealers probably 
compensate smaller profits on the off-the-run segment with higher profits on the on-the-run one, 
that is, in the event of no obligations and monitoring on the off-the-run securities, the spreads on the 
on-the-run segment would probably be smaller than they are at present. Conversely, the spreads on 
the off-the-run segment would probably be larger than they are at present. 
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We exploited the new insights about market liquidity in order to understand when a new issued 
bond acquires the status of benchmark. The empirical evidence shows that the average number of 
days needed to gain the benchmark status is increasing in the original maturity of the bond and is in 
general less than 30 working days. This means that the benchmark status is not acquired 
immediately, but usually we do not need to wait the first reopening, i.e. the second auction. 
However, in many cases the benchmark status is actually achieved just a few days before the second 
auction, and it may be the case that the expectation of a new issue has a positive impact on trade. 
Furthermore, when our definition of benchmark is tightened, i.e. the number of consecutive days of 
higher trading activity is set at six, the benchmark status is achieved only after the third and even 
the forth auction. The 10 year BTPs seem to be more sensible to variations in the selection criterion. 
In the end, some modifications of the issuance policy in order to have a larger outstanding since the 
first auctions could help securities in gaining their benchmark status, especially in case of 10 year 
BTPs 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the microstructure of the MTS markets, 
section 3 surveys the literature on liquidity measures and definitions, section 4 states our research 
agenda, elaborates on our dataset, introduces and classify the liquidity measures employed in our 
analysis, section 5 presents our main empirical results, section 6 analyses the achievement of the 
benchmark status by on-the-run securities, section 7 estimates the liquidity premium. 
 
2. Liquidity 
 
A financial security is liquid if it can be traded in a marked without affecting its price. The 
importance of the liquidity of GS markets stems from the fact that it allows market participants to 
hedge positions in other fixed income securities, to speculate on interest rates and to price correctly 
other securities such as derivatives on interest rates. Hence, the measurement of liquidity is of 
relevance to those who transact in the market and to those who monitor and analyze market 
conditions and developments. In particular, liquidity is a key issue for central bank functions, 
including the conduct of monetary policy and the maintenance of financial stability. Furthermore, 
the degree of liquidity of a security plays a role in the determination of the security yield. Therefore, 
it can relevantly affect the cost of liability management. In particular, government debt management 
offices are highly concerned about the liquidity of GS markets. 
 
The importance of liquidity in preserving the stability and efficiency of capital markets means that 
the role of public policy is fundamental. Regulations can help fostering higher-quality markets at 
little cost. Conversely, public policy can also harm the liquidity of markets. Therefore, the 
determinants and mechanics of liquidity in these markets deserve great attention. In effect, although 
in the last decade the major body of literature about market microstructure focused on equity and 
foreign exchange markets1, now the strand of literature about liquidity in bond markets is growing 
in importance and this is also due to the recent availability of high frequency data2. Fleming (1997, 
2001, and 2003) for US, D’Sousa, Gaa and Yang (2003) for Canada and Cheung, de Jong and Rindi 
(2005), Girardi and Piga (2007) for the Euro area measure liquidity and order flows in GSM. 
Fleming and Remolona (1999), Bollerslev, Cai and Song (2000), Balduzzi, Elton, and Green 
(2001), Green (2004) analyse price formation and liquidity in the US Treasury market by examining 
the response of prices, trading volume and bid-ask spreads to macroeconomic announcements. 
Pagano and von Thadden (2004) document the impact of EMU on the European Bond Market in 
                                                 
1
 Madhavan (2000) and Lyons (2001) survey respectively stock and forex markets. 
2GovPx for US, CanPx for Canada and MTS Time Series for Europe. 
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terms of markets integration and liquidity, the consequent emergence of the MTS and Eurex 
markets and they discuss pros and cons of the “Liquidity Pact”3. 
 
2.1 Definitions  
Market liquidity is a concept that turns out to be hard to pin down. Actually, it has multidimensional 
aspects and many definitions of markets liquidity are available. For instance, a liquid market can be 
defined as one in which trades can be executed without costs (O’Hara 1995); another definition 
states that in a liquid market the participants can rapidly execute large-volume transactions with 
small impact on prices (CGFS 1999). The usual approach (see for instance Kyle 1985) that the 
market microstructure literature adopts (see for instance Kyle, 1985) is to think liquidity along three 
possible dimensions: Tightness, depth and resiliency. Tightness4 indicates how far transaction prices 
diverge from mid market prices (i.e. the cost of providing liquidity), depth is the maximal size of a 
trade for any given bid/ask spread (or the maximum volume of trades without a significant affection 
of prices) or the amount of orders on the order-books of market makers at a given time and 
resiliency refers to how quickly prices revert to original (or fundamental) levels after a large 
transaction (i.e. the speed with which price fluctuations resulting from a trade are dissipated). 
Another commonly used concept is immediacy, defined as the speed with which a trade of a given 
size at a given cost is completed. However, it incorporates elements of the dimensions listed above 
and, strictly speaking, it is not a separate dimension5. 
 
2.2 Survey of liquidity measures 
The analysis of market liquidity avails itself of different measures, the preference between one and 
another depending mainly on the goal of the analysis and data availability. Table 2.1 provides a 
survey of the most conventional measures, the first and the second column give a definition and 
some comments, the third column reports the expected relation with market liquidity. Moreover, the 
first column reports, between square brackets, alternative definition for the measure. As a matter of 
fact, the definition of many variables is often not unique, since the purpose of the analysis or data 
availability can differ. The measures reviewed in Table 2.1 range from general information about 
the securities (e.g. issued amount and age) and the market (e.g. number of participants, bid quantity 
etc.) to more complex indexes (e.g. percentage bid-ask spread, market quality index etc.). The table 
also permits to group the variables as trading variables, order book variables and other variables.  
                                                 
3
 From a theoretical point of view, Amihud and Mendelson (1986, 1991) and more recently Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2003) provide a model explaining the role of liquidity in asset pricing and in government bond asset pricing. 
4
 Sometimes in literature it is referred to as width.  
5
 Sources of the definitions are CGFS (1999) and D’Souza and Gaa (2004).   
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Table 2.1 Liquidity Measures: Definitions and Comments 
Definitions Comments 
Expected 
Relation to 
Liquidity 
issued amount: the size of the issuance (Houweling 
et al. 2003). 
The larger the outstanding stock of 
publicly issued central government debt, 
generally the higher the turnover in cash 
and futures trading. And the higher the 
turnover, the better the liquidity 
(McCauley Remolona 2000). 
+ 
age: time from issuance (Houweling et al. 2003). It is important for instance because of 
the market segmentation for different 
asset maturity (Martinez Resano 2005) 
- 
missing prices: it occurs when the bond did not trade 
in a given interval of time. 
 
If the price at the end of the day is 
identical to that of the previous day, it is 
highly likely the bond did not trade; 
likewise if there is a missing price 
(Houweling et al. 2003). 
- 
bid-ask spread: 
 
quoted: gap between quoted bid and ask prices, and 
is observed before an actual transaction takes place 
(CGFS 1999).[difference between the best bid and 
the best ask at any time and averaged over all quotes 
in a day (Goldreich et al., 2005)] 
 
realised: gap between weighted averages of the bid 
and ask prices for executed trades over a period of 
time, using the transaction volumes at each price as 
the weights (CGFS 1999). 
 
effective: twice the difference between each 
transaction price and the mid-quote immediately 
preceding the transaction (Goldreich et al., 2005 e 
Chung et al., 2005). [expressed as a percentage of 
the mid-quote based on the actual transaction price 
(Dunne et al. 2006)]. 
A drawback is that bid and offer quotes 
are good only for limited quantities and 
periods of time, thus it only measures 
the cost of executing a single trade of 
limited size. To allow for comparison 
between different securities it should be 
adjusted to take into account duration 
(Fleming 2003). 
Wider spreads may also simply reflect 
that the bond in question is illiquid for 
structural, as opposed to market 
structure, reasons (Casey Lannoo 2005). 
 
The effective spread incorporates the 
change in the price between when it is 
quoted and when it is executed (CGFS 
1999). 
- 
percentage quoted spread: the average of the ratio of 
the quoted bid/ask spread to the bid/ask price 
midpoint (Bollen Whaley 1998). [using only two-
sided quotes (Brandt Kavajecz 2004)]. 
 
percentage effective spread: dividing the dollar 
effective spread by the quote midpoint (Chung Kimb 
2005) 
It illustrates that spreads differ by the 
level of share price. Trading costs for 
low price per share stocks are higher. 
- 
volume weighted average quoted spread: the average 
of the quoted bid/ask spreads during the day 
weighted by the proportion of daily trading volume 
executed while each pair of quotes was in effect 
(Bollen Whaley 2005). 
It is a measure of depth of the limit order 
book associated to a specific transaction 
size, it reflects the implicit cost for an 
immediate transaction of a given size 
(Cheung et al. 2005). It weights the 
prevailing quotes by the number of 
shares traded (as a proportion of total 
daily trading volume) while the quotes 
were in effect. Consequently, this 
- 
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measure of quoted spread is more 
accurate a priori since transactions at the 
prevailing quotes indicate that prices 
were “firm.” (Boll Whaley 1998) 
trade - weighted effective spread (Chung Kimb 
2005) 
 
- 
price impact of trades: the difference between the 
effective and realized spreads. (Chung Kimb 2005) 
 
- 
quote size: the quantity of securities that is explicitly 
bid for or offered for sale at the posted bid and offer 
prices (Fleming 2003). 
It can underestimate depth because 
market makers usually do not reveal the 
full quantity they want to transact 
(Fleming 2003). 
+ 
best liquidity: the average of the quoted size at the 
best bid and offer where considering the quotes 
immediately preceding the transactions (Dunne et al. 
2006). 
 
+ 
total liquidity: the average of the total amount 
offered and the total amount bid in the best three 
quotes where only including the quotes immediately 
preceding the trades (Dunne et al. 2006). 
 
+ 
quote frequency: the number of non-repeated quotes 
in a  time interval (D’Souza Gaa 2004). 
It is a measure of market activity 
(D’Souza Gaa 2004). +? 
trade size: ex-post measure of the quantity of 
securities that can be traded at the bid or offer price 
(Fleming 2003). 
It is an endogenous measure because it 
depends on a negotiation that depends 
on the liquidity of the market (D’Souza 
Gaa 2004). Higher trade size is usually 
associated to low transparency (Dunne 
et al. 2006) 
+? 
bid-side market depth: the difference between bid 
and mid price, divided by the bid quantity (Favero et 
al. 2005). 
 
+ 
ask-side market depth: the difference between mid 
price and ask price, divided by the ask quantity 
(Favero et al. 2005). 
 
+ 
quoted depth: the average of the bid and ask depth 
per quoted price, both one and two-sided quotes are 
used in the calculation (Brandt Kavajecz 2004). 
A drawback of this estimate, however, is 
that market makers often do not reveal 
the full quantities they are willing to 
transact at a given price, so the measured 
depth underestimates the true depth 
(Fleming 2003). 
+ 
cumulative limit order book depth: sum of the depth 
posted at the three best price points on both the buy 
and sell side of the limit order book and average the 
two sides together (Beber et al. 2007). 
 
+ 
price impact coefficient (Kyle lambda): the slope of 
the line that relates the price change to trade size and 
is typically estimated by regressing price changes on 
net volume for intervals of fixed time (Fleming 
2003). 
The measure is relevant to those 
executing large trades or a series of 
trades (Fleming 2003). One drawback is 
that, although it necessitates the use of 
detailed high-frequency data, it is 
estimated over a longer sample period 
(weekly or yearly). The estimated price-
impact coefficients therefore cannot be 
used directly in an analysis of intraday 
market conditions (D’Souza et al. 2003). 
- 
liquidity premium: “liquidity” spread between more It can be calculated without high- - 
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and less liquid securities, often calculated as the 
difference between the yield of an on the-run 
security and that of an off-the-run security with 
similar cash flow characteristics (Fleming 2003). 
frequency data. Moreover, because the 
spread reflects both the price of liquidity 
as well as differences in liquidity 
between securities, it provides insight 
into the value of liquidity not provided 
by the other measures. However, factors 
besides liquidity can cause on-the-run 
securities to trade at a premium, 
confounding the interpretation of the 
spread. Furthermore, the choice of an 
off-the-run benchmark against which to 
compare an on-the-run security can 
result in considerable estimation error 
(Fleming 2003). 
trading volume: the total value of securities traded 
per unit of time (D’Souza Gaa 2004). 
It is positively related with price 
volatility which is negatively related to 
liquidity (Fleming 2003). 
? 
trading frequency: the number of trades executed 
within a specified interval, without regard to trade 
size (Fleming 2003). 
It is positively related with price 
volatility which is negatively related to 
liquidity (Fleming 2003). 
? 
price volatility if we assume a constant fundamental 
level of prices, volatility in prices could 
reflect bid-ask spread, the market impact 
of trades and/or the degree of resiliency 
(CGFS 1999) 
- 
turnover ratio: the ratio of the average trading 
volume over a given period of time to the 
outstanding volume of securities (CGFS 1999). 
 
If the government or the central bank  
take a large portion of marketable 
securities out of the market, we should 
account for it (i.e. subtract such holding 
from the outstanding volume) (Inoue 
1999). 
+ 
number of market participants in a given time 
interval 
 
+ 
net trading quantity: the volume of buyer-initiated 
trades minus the volume of seller-initiated trades 
over the time interval (D’Souza Gaa 2004). 
net trading count: the number of buyer-initiated 
trades minus the number of seller-initiated trades 
over the time interval (D’Souza Gaa 2004). 
Those are conventional measures of 
trading activity (D’Souza Gaa 2004). 
 
- 
order imbalance: notional value of buys less the 
notional value of sells each day, divided by the total 
value of buys and sells (Chordia Sakar 2005). 
 
? 
market quality index: the average quoted depth 
divided by the percentage bid-ask spread (Boll 
Whaley 1998 & Beber et al. 2007). 
Index designed to capture the trade-off 
between quoted bid/ask spread and 
market depth (Boll Whaley 1998). 
+ 
steepness: the average of steepness on each side of 
the order book. The steepness is the difference 
between the 3rd worst bid/offer and the best 
bid/offer expressed as a percentage of the mid-point 
between these, multiplied by 100 to show it in basis 
points terms (Dunne et al. 2006). 
 
- 
Cost of Round Trip trade (CRT): the percentage cost 
to buy and sell the same number of shares at the 
same time (a round-trip trade) by submitting market 
orders (Irvine et al. 2000). 
Cheung et al. (2005) give a formulation of CRT for 
It aggregates the status of the limit order 
book at any moment in time for a 
specific transaction size. It measures the 
ex ante committed liquidity immediately 
available in the market, complementing 
- 
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the bond market. the effective spread. For a particular 
trade size, smaller cost indicates a more 
liquid market (Irvine et al. 2000). 
Note: The question mark indicates that the theoretical relation with liquidity is not univocal. 
 
 
3. Methodology of the empirical analysis 
 
Given the survey of liquidity measures, in this section we present and explain in detail the measures 
we employed in the empirical analysis and the methodology we followed.  
 
3.1. Research agenda 
Each of the previous liquidity measures describes a particular aspect of the market. They can be 
separated in two main groups: Trade measures and order book measures. Trade measures draw on 
data on actual financial transactions. Order book measures, on the contrary, describe the 
characteristics of the order book of the proposals of transactions which are available in the market. 
In order to measure market liquidity, both trade measures and order book measures are useful and 
they complement each other. Furthermore, their relevance in catching the various aspects of market 
liquidity depends on the microstructure of the market which is under examination. 
 
In the case of MTS market, the quality of the order book is particularly relevant. In effect, the 
quotes on the book are firm and immediately executable. Therefore, the features of the order book 
and their evolution in time define the amount of liquidity provided by the market makers. Under 
this respect, trade measures can be used in order to verify if the liquidity provided by the order book 
is consistent with the trade needs revealed by the market. 
 
The main comparative advantage of our research is the availability of high frequency data on the 
whole order book. Despite the relevance of MTS among government securities markets and the 
huge amount of information contained in the available data, no previous research has given 
systematic and thorough evidence on MTS order book. Therefore, our preliminary and main aim 
was the exploitation of the data set and the presentation of a consistent set of indicators and 
measures, which could give comprehensive description of the most important features of order book 
and trading data. Drawing on the results of the descriptive, mainly non parametric analysis, in the 
last part of the present research report we tried to identify the features that make an on-the-run 
security a benchmark. 
 
In order to describe our data set and to give evidence on MTS liquidity we followed the following 
steps: 
- elaboration of a taxonomy of liquidity measures; 
- elaboration of new liquidity measures and indicators that could exploit the richness of our 
dataset; 
- computation of old and new measures and indicators both on high frequency data and on a 
weekly base;  
- selection of the measures and indicators which give the most useful and efficient description of 
market liquidity. This evaluation was based, first, on univariate analysis and, second, on the 
correlations between measures and indicators, in order to assess their reciprocal consistency and 
their reaction with respect to indicators of market conditions, such as price volatility and 
number of market makers; 
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- computation of measures and indicators on sub-samples of data in order to assess the robustness 
of the empirical results. Namely, the dataset was split between on-the-run and off-the-run 
securities, between hours of trade concentration and rest of the day, between days where 
auctions of the same security were taking place on the primary market and rest of the days; 
- analysis of the correlation coefficients between liquidity measures in order to evaluate their 
mutual relationships, reciprocal consistency and reaction to market conditions; 
- liquidity comparison across securities of different maturity and analysis of the commonality in 
market liquidity. 
 
3.2. Order book measures: A taxonomy  
We classify order book measures according to three dimensions: Tightness, depth and breadth. The 
first dimension is about the distance between the ask and the bid side of the book. Tightness is the 
dimension whose connection with the meaning of liquidity is the clearest: The closer the two sides, 
the more liquid the market. A tight order book reduces the cost of successive buy and sell 
operations on the same security. The second dimension of our taxonomy, depth, deals with the 
quantity available for trade on each side of the book. The relationship between depth and the 
concept of liquidity is clear as well: The deeper the order book the more liquid the market. 
However, in order to gauge market liquidity we need not only the simple measure of the quantity 
available for trade but also its position in the book. The third dimension of our classification, 
breadth, measures how wide the order book is. While depth captures the vertical dimension of each 
side of the order book, by measuring the quantitative relevance of each proposal, breadth catches 
the corresponding horizontal dimension by measuring the multiplicity, the variety among the 
proposals: “A broad market has many participants, none of whom is presumed to exert significant 
market power”6.  
 
Breath is the dimension of our classification whose relationship with the concept of liquidity is 
more controversial. According to some authors the narrower the order book, the more liquid a 
market7. In effect, when one side of the order book is as narrow as possible, that is when it is 
concentrated just in a quote, all the order book depth is available at the best quote and market 
liquidity is at maximum for that given level of depth. However, as long as the order book is not 
wholly concentrated on the best quote, the relationship between breadth and liquidity becomes 
vaguer. A wide order book where the quantity available for trade is mostly concentrated on the best 
price is more liquid than an order book made of two adjacent prices where the same quantity is 
mostly concentrated on the second best price. In our understanding breadth has to be combined with 
depth in order to have a reliable measure of liquidity. 
 
In the following we are going to use our taxonomy in order to present the order book measures that 
we employed in the empirical analysis8. The measures are considered to be either unidimensional, 
when they evaluate just one of the three dimensions of our taxonomy, or multidimensional, when 
they are a combination of at least two dimensions. We are going to present, first, the unidimensional 
measures and, later, the multidimensional ones. All the unidimensional measures are drawn from 
the wide literature surveyed above. On the contrary, some of the multidimensional measures we are 
going to present were originally elaborated by us in order to exploit the richness of our dataset. 
 
                                                 
6
 See Hasbrouck (2007). The breadth is strictly connected with market thickness, as defined in Roth (2007). 
7
 See Dunne, Moore, Portes (2006). 
8
 The complete set of the investigated measures includes also midquote, percentage quoted spread, quantity weighted 
bid (ask) skewness, quantity weighted bid (ask) kurtosis. The final set of measures has been worked out after an 
evaluation of all the measures in terms of univariate and correlations analysis. 
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Tightness 
The tightness of the order book is measured by spreads. We are going to use three different 
definitions of spread: best spread, spread and weighted spread. Best spread is the difference 
between the best ask price and best bid price9. It is the simplest measure of spread and it can be 
quickly and easily calculated with data that are widely available. However, it takes into account 
only one price on each side of the book and the quantity available for trade at the best prices could 
be very small. The whole set of quotes in any snapshot is included in the definitions of spread and 
weighted spread10. The former is the difference between the simple average of the ask prices and 
bid prices. The latter is the difference between the weighted averages, where the weights are given 
by the quantity available for trade at each quote. The last two measures are more complete, but they 
can not be so quickly and easily calculated as best spread is. 
 
Depth 
We employed several measures of depth: Best size, second size, worst size, quote size, average 
quote size, weighted depth and quote size per participant. All the measures we are going to present 
hereafter are averages of the corresponding measures on the two sides of the order book. 
Preliminary analyses showed the perfect symmetry between the two sides. Quote size is the total 
quantity available for trade in the snapshot11. Its value does not depend on the position of the 
quantity in the book. However, the degree of liquidity of a given amount of quantity for trade is 
strictly related to its position in the book. In order to evaluate the degree of liquidity of a given total 
amount available for trade we employed three other measures that split the total quote size in three 
parts according to the position of the quote quantity in the book: Best size, second size and worst 
size12 measure respectively the quantity available at the best price, at the second best price and in 
the rest of the book. The rational behind this splitting is clear: If an increase of the depth is due to an 
increase of the quantity available for trade far from the top of the book, then quote size would 
overstate the actual market liquidity. Hence, a distinction between quote sizes on the top of the book 
and on the rest of it better captures the real depth of the market.  
 
We also adopted synthetic measures of depth, that is we calculated some statistics of the quantity 
available for trade that could better captures the liquidity of the order book in each snapshot. 
Average quote size is the average quantity available for trade per quoted price13. It measures how 
dispersed the quote size is among different quotes. The higher the average quote size, the deeper the 
order book. Average quote size, however, is independent of the position of quote size in the book. 
This represents a major drawback of the measure. That is why we put forward a new measure: 
weighted depth. Weighted depth is the weighted sum of the quantity available for trade. The 
weights are inversely related to the position of the quantity in the book. The quantity available at 
best price, that is best size, has weight equal to one. Any other quantity in the book has smaller 
weight and the weight is decreasing with the distance between best price and the price 
corresponding to the given quantity. Finally, quote size per market participants is calculated by 
averaging the quantity available for trade. The average, however, is not taken on the set of different 
prices quoted, as in the case of average quote size, but on the set of market makers who expose a 
double quote in each snapshot. Therefore, it measures the average quantity exposed by each market 
participant. 
                                                 
9
 Appendix B provides the analytical formulation of the complete set of the employed measures. Best spread matches 
with the quoted bid-ask spread in Goldredich (2005). 
10
 Spread and weighted spread match with the quoted bid-ask spread in CGFS (1999). 
11
 Quote size matches the quote size in Fleming (2003) and it is close to both total liquidity in Dunne et al. (2006) and 
cumulative order book in Berber et al. (2006). 
12
 Best liquidity matches with the best liquidity in Dunne et al. (2006). Second and worst size are not present in the 
papers we surveyed. 
13
 Average quote size matches quoted depth in Brandt and Kavajecz (2004). 
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Breadth 
We employed only one measure of breadth: Steepness14. Steepness is the absolute difference 
between the best and the worst quote, scaled on the mid-point between the two. As we argued 
above, breath is the dimension of our classification whose relationship with the concept of liquidity 
is more controversial. In the following section we will report summary statistics on steepness and 
we will evaluate if it actually shows a pattern of variability across time which is consistent with the 
patter shown by other measures whose relationship with market liquidity is unambiguous.  
 
Multidimensional measures 
In order to overcome the ambiguity of steepness as a measure of market liquidity we developped 
three new measures of liquidity: Slope, DS and DSS. They are multidimensional measures because 
they draw on two dimensions of our taxonomy, namely, depth and breadth. By combining breadth 
with depth we were able to elaborate new indexes whose relationship with market liquidity we 
expect to be clear-cut. Slope is the ratio between the absolute difference between the best and the 
worst quote and the difference between quote size and best size. Geometrically, when we represent 
quoted prices on the vertical axis and the corresponding cumulative quantities on the horizontale 
axis, slope is the gradient of the linear interpolation between two points whose coordinates are best 
price and best size, on one hand, and worst price and total size, on the other hand. As long as the 
scatter diagram of quoted prices and corresponding cumulative quantities is concentrated around the 
interpolation line previously defined, slope measures the increase in marginal quoted price a dealer 
has to bear for trading € 100 mln, additional to the best size15. As a consequence, the relationship 
between slope and market liquidity should be transparent: The higher the slope, the lower the 
liquidity.  
 
DS is a measure very similar to slope. The differential impact of trade on marginal quoted price, 
however, is not computed on the basis of a linear interpolation between two points. DS is the 
regression coefficient of the regression of quoted prices on corresponding cumulative quantities. 
Obviously, the connection between DS and market liquidity is the same as the one between slope 
and liquidity: The smaller DS, the more liquid the market. 
 
DSS is the estimate of another regression coefficient. It is based on deep spread. For each 
cumulative quantity in the order book deep spread gives the corresponding maginal bid-ask spread. 
In other words, when the cumulative quantity on the bid side of the order book has a corresponding 
cumulative quantity on ask side, we compute the marginal spread insisting on that quantity. Hence, 
we measure the relationship between changes in the quantities and changes in the marginal spread 
by regressing the deep spread on the corresponding cumulative quantity. DSS measures the increase 
in marginal spread that a dealer has to bear for an additional purchase and sale of the security. 
Conceptually, it is very close to DS and slope and it has the same relationship with market liquidity. 
 
Another interesting multidimensional measure is market quality index16. It combines the same two 
dimensions as DSS: tightness and depth. It is computed by taking the ratio between average quote 
size and spread scaled on the mid price. It measures the average quote quantity per percentage point 
of spread. The higher is the index, the higher the liquidity. For reasons that will be clear later, we 
employed a modified specification of the measure as well. In Market quality index 2 quote size 
substitute for average quote size at the numerator of the index. 
                                                 
14
 Steepness matches with steepness in Dunne et al. (2006). 
15
 Slope is analogous to the price impact coefficient, i.e. the Kyle lambda, in Fleming (2003). However, slope is an 
order book measure, on the contrary price impact coefficient is calculated on trade data. 
16
 Market quality index matches with market quality index in Boll and Whaley (1998) and in Berber et al. (2006). 
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Finally, following Cheung et al. (2005) we adapted to the bond market the Irvine et al. (2000) 
percentage cost of the round trip. This is the weighted average price at which a double order of sell 
and buy of size L could be immediately executed at time t. The best spread is a particular case of 
the CRT when the best size is larger than L. Cost of the round trip is a multidimensional measure: It 
combines tightness and depth, as in the case of market quality index and DSS. Obviously, a smaller 
CRT indicates a more liquid market. In order to choose L, we worked out the distribution of trade 
sizes for all the securities in the sample. It turns out that the most frequently traded quantities for 
MTS Italy are 2.5, 5 and 10 million of euros. Following Cheung et al. (2005) we evaluate the CRT 
also for L = 25. In what follows we will focus on the CRT for L = 10 and we will call it CRT10. 
 
Market conditions 
We used a couple of indicators to measure market conditions. Market participants measures the 
number of active market makers in each snapshot. It will be considered as an indicator of the degree 
of competition among the primary dealers. Absolute price change is our measure of market’s 
volatility. It is the absolute difference between the average mid prices of two following snapshots. 
The two measures are frequently used to proxy liquidity. We consider them as indicators of market 
conditions.  
 
3.3. Trading measures employed in our analysis 
The measures introduced so far exploit order book data. Now we turn to measures that rely on 
trading data. A first common measure is trading volume, measured as the quantity traded multiplied 
by the contract price and then aggregated over the interval between two consecutive snapshots. 
Other popular measures are the trading frequency and the turnover ratio that are respectively the 
number of contracts in a given time interval and the ratio between trading volume and the 
outstanding, that is the issued quantity of a given security. Trade size is simply the average size of 
trades in the interval between two consecutive snapshots17. 
 
A widespread liquidity measure, which arises from an econometric estimation, is the price impact 
coefficient. In effect, a liquid market is a market where participants can rapidly execute large-
volume transactions with a small impact on prices, and this measure just estimates the price impact 
of trades. Firstly introduced by Kyle (1985), both Fleming (2003) and D’Souza et al. (2003) 
underline the importance of its estimation. We estimate the following model:  
tt
t
tt NT
P
PP
εβα ++=−
−
−
*
1
1
     (1) 
Where NT is a measure of market activity and more precisely it is either net trading quantity or net 
trading count18. Even though it necessitates the use of detailed high-frequency data, equation (1) 
needs to be estimated over a long sample period. We estimated the model both over the whole 
sample and weekly. We used the regression coefficients as measures of the price impact, and we 
called them NTQ and NTC respectively19.  
 
 
                                                 
17
 Trading volume, trading frequency, turnover ratio, trade size match with the measures employed in D’Souza and Gaa 
(2004) and Fleming (2003), among others. 
18
 Net trading quantity and net trading count match with the variables employed in D’Souza and Gaa (2003). 
19
 In the following analysis we will also provide an estimation of several models, as in Fleming (2003), for the whole 
sample. 
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4. The Microstructure of Italian Government Securities Markets  
 
Italian Government finances its public deficit by issuing debt securities, on December 2006 they 
account for 80% of the public debt. The Italian Market of Government Securities (GS) consists of 
two sectors: The primary market20 and the secondary market. In the primary market bonds and notes 
are mainly placed through auction mechanisms. The Italian Ministry of Treasury avails itself of a 
Primary Dealership system. Among Primary Dealers it chooses a group of so called Specialists, 
which status entails themselves of privileges and obligations: For instance, Specialists have the 
faculty to participate to reserved auction reopening; they have to provide certain levels of liquidity 
both to the cash and to the Repo markets to preserve their status. In the secondary markets GS are 
traded in two ways: Organized exchange markets, and over-the-counter. In the latter the main 
players are investment banks and most of them participate also to the primary market. In the former 
we can distinguish a retail market (i.e. the MOT) and a wholesale market. The majority of trading 
occurs on wholesale markets. In particular, among the wholesale markets, MTS (Mercato 
Telematico dei titoli di Stato) is the leading market in Europe for the trading of fixed income 
securities with its over 1200 participants throughout Europe and average transaction volumes of up 
to 85 billion euros a day (single-counted)21. Italian bonds, however, are quoted on other trading 
electronic platforms as well. In Europe electronic trade accounts for 75% of daily trade volume for 
government bonds22. Since the analysis of the primary market is beyond the scope of this paper, this 
section will focus on the secondary market and in particular on the MTS market. 
 
4.1. MTS model: An overview 
MTS was the first electronic market for GS and it was introduced in 1988 by the Italian Treasury as 
a platform for co-ordinating the activity of its primary dealer group within Italy. The original model 
required that, in exchange for committing liquidity, banks would be recognised as primary dealers, 
and they would gain the right to participate in auctions and receive a steady supply of new issues; 
however, this model was limited to the single issuer within the lira currency zone. 
 
The development of MTS, from the privatisation in 1997 to the establishment of EuroMTS in 
199923, tracks the development of the European bond markets. Indeed, the introduction of the euro 
and the progress of electronic trading and settlement motivated MTS to develop a strategy to exploit 
the new-found scalability of its model across both geography and bond type. Moreover, with the 
beginning of the single currency zone, the dealer community supported the emergence of specific 
standards related to issuance sizes and transparency of the issuance policy. Eventually, the MTS 
platform became the natural catalyst for setting common standards of bond issuance, quotation 
requirements and transparency of the issuance policy. The first stage was the foundation of 
EuroMTS, the pan-European benchmark platform, to promote such standards, and the birth of the 
so called Liquidity Pact. According to the Pact, dealers and issuers undertake commitments to each 
other, and the MTS platform is used by both sides of the market to monitor and bring transparency 
to it. 
 
The key to the success of this trading platform is to be found not only in its technical capabilities, 
but also in MTS’s ability to bring together issuers and dealers and to induce them to commit to a 
few simple rules. The aim was to foster secondary market liquidity. In addition, in some countries 
                                                 
20
 For a deeper analysis of the primary market see Bagella et al. (2006). 
21
 Source: MTSGroup web site. 
22
 See Pierron (2004), mentioned in Paesani and Piga (2007). 
23
 Scalia and Vacca (1999) provide a description of the developments of the Italian Treasury securities secondary 
market occurred in the last two decades. 
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the quoting and trading performances on MTS are taken into account by government debt 
management offices to admit dealers to the primary market. As many other multilateral agreements, 
the Liquidity Pact comes with benefits but also with costs since it may favour free riding: Any 
participant can profit from the liquidity provided by the other participants and make other dealers to 
lose money24.  
 
The last stage of the MTS transformation was the merge of EuroMTS with MTS S.p.a. into MTS 
Global Market in 2001. Moreover, since the end of the nineties the MTS system expanded to other 
country markets and to high quality non government bond25. The MTS model uses a common 
trading platform; however, regulatory responsibilities are within the competence of domestic 
authorities. In effect, rules governing electronic platforms share some common characteristics, but 
there are some differences across countries. For instance markets makers must have net assets of at 
least €100 million to join MTS Belgium and just €39 million to join MTS Italy. Shares in EuroMTS 
are held by MTS S.p.a., whose shareholders are Borsa Italiana S.p.a. and the major financial 
institutions that have a strong presence in the European secondary government bond markets. Till 
recently, one of the main shareholders of MTS S.p.a. had been Euronext, the company which 
controls the Paris stock exchange and other major stock exchanges in Europe. In the occasion of the 
merge between Euronext and New York Stock Exchange, the shares of MTS S.p.a. owned by 
Euronext were bought back by Borsa Italiana S.p.a.. 
 
4.2 MTS microstructure 
Let now consider the structure and functioning of MTS. MTS is a wholesale inter-dealer market, 
this means that individuals cannot access to it. Although the requirements for participants depend 
on the market in which they operate, we can broadly distinguish two categories of participants, 
namely market makers and market takers. The former have to quote continuously two-way firm and 
immediately executable proposals for a selected subset of securities. The prices usually have to be 
posted for at least five hours per day and for a certain minimum quantity, and they are subject to 
maximum spread obligations depending on bonds maturity and liquidity. Each market maker can 
voluntarily quote other securities as well, facing in this case no constraint on price proposals. No 
market making obligation applies to market takers that can buy or sell at the given prices. MTS 
markets are an example of quote-driven electronic order book. This implies that market makers’ 
quotations are aggregated in a book according to price and side of the market. Since orders of round 
lots26 are executed according price priority and time priority (i.e. first in first out) and the quoted 
proposals are firm and immediately executable, we can say that MTS works as a limit order book. 
To facilitate the handling of large transactions, minimum lot sizes27 are high and trading rules grant 
traders a high degree of anonymity28. In effect, price proposals are anonymous and the identity of 
the counterparty of a trade is revealed only after the trade is executed for clearing and settlement 
                                                 
24
 For instance, in August 2004 Citigroup in few seconds flooded MTS with sales and then it repurchases a large 
amount of bond at a lower price, earning about 15 million euros at the expense of the other market makers, see Munter 
and van Duyn (2004).  
25On March 2007 the markets of the MTS platform are the following: EuroMTS , MTS S.p.a. (MTS Italy), EuroCredit 
MTS, NewEuroMTS, EuroBenchmark Treasury Bills Market, EuroMTS Linkers Market, MTS Cedulas Market, MTS 
Quasi-Government Market, EuroGlobalMTS, MTS Amsterdam, MTS Austrian Market, MTS Belgium, MTS Denmark, 
MTS Deutschland, MTS España, MTS Finland, MTS France, MTS Greek Market, MTS Ireland, MTS Israel, MTS 
Poland, MTS Portugal, MTS Slovenia, BondVision, EuroMTS Indices. 
26
 Odd lots are admitted but they are subject to market makers’ acceptance. 
27
 Proposals must be formulated for a minimum quantity equal to € 10, € 5 or € 2.5 million depending on the instrument 
(bucket of maturity, liquid/ benchmark security). 
28Actually, this was not the case when MTS was founded. Indeed, in July 1997, 10 years after its inception, MTS 
switched to a new operation regime in which the names of market-makers who post bid and ask quotes for each security 
are not revealed. See Scalia and Vacca (1999) analyze this change in the degree of transparency. 
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purposes. In particular if a central counterparty (CCP) is used, counterparties will not know 
identities; if the trade is settled bilaterally, only the counterparties will know identities. Moreover, 
market makers are not required to show the maximum quantity they are willing to trade: A 
participant may limit the display of his proposals to a partial amount (drip quantity) between the 
minimum trading lot and the total amount of the proposal (block quantity). Both cash and repo 
transactions are admitted29. Even if anonymity in transactions is guaranteed, the MTS system is 
highly transparent since quotes and transactions go directly to data vendors as Bloomberg and 
Reuters. As a result, they are immediately available, at a cost, to any market participants. Moreover, 
data30 provide the information about the first five levels of the order book. 
 
Pre- and post-trade31 information is available outside the electronic platform space in real-time. 
Dealers on the MTS platform have access to real-time executable quotes and to a fully transparent 
order book. Professional investors have an indirect access to the same information through data 
vendors. In particular, the MTS group aggregate information through the so called MTS Data. 
MTS’s data products are grouped into two areas, namely MTS Live Market Data and MTS Value- 
Added Data. MTS Live Market Data32 includes real time bond market data providing best bid and 
offer quotes, market depth, as well as the last traded price, all complete with related volumes. It is 
important to underline that these prices are actual traded prices or prices that are live and executable 
on the MTS platform. Data are available to data vendors33 also at snapshot34, delayed and end-of -
day frequencies. MTS Value-Added Data Products are made up of MTS Daily Data, MTS 
Historical Data, EuroMTS Indices and MTS Today, which is a daily analytics report. In particular, 
MTS Daily Data includes the reference prices35 and corresponding yields calculated for all 
European government, Treasury bills and non-government bonds traded on MTS Markets at 11:00 
CET as an “Open” fixing and at 16:00 CET as a “Close” fixing. It is worth to note that these prices 
are published immediately after each fixing. With respect to data available to anybody at no cost, 
the daily price statistics of MTS Markets for cash and repo segments can be accessed and 
downloaded by selecting the corresponding MTS market on the MTS Group’s website. These lists 
are updated daily at the close of the market and display the date of trading, the ISIN code, the type 
of bond, the description of each security and the minimum and maximum price of trades executed 
along with the average daily weighted price for each security. 
As already mentioned, MTS markets are active in several European countries, an exception is the 
London-based EuroMTS, designed for trading in European benchmark issues between the largest 
and most active dealers. An interesting feature of this system is that benchmark government bonds 
tend to be traded both on EuroMTS and on domestic (MTS) systems. In the period 2004-2006 only 
5% of the Italian bonds and notes exchanged on electronic systems have been traded on EuroMTS 
and about 95% on MTS Italy36. CGFS (2001) analyses the daily trading volumes and bid-ask 
spreads of benchmark Italian government bonds (BTPs) quoted on MTS Italy and shows that no 
                                                 
29
 For additional details see “MTS Regulations - Governing the Wholesale Italian and Foreign Government Bond 
Market” available at http://www.mtsspa.it/content/about/download/mtsmarketrules.pdf. 
30
 Both cash and repo data are displayed. 
31
 For an assessment of pre- and post-trade information, from the perspective of the transparency provisions envisioned 
in 2004/39/EC Directive disciplining the functioning of markets for financial instruments in Europe (MiFID), see 
Paesani and Piga (2007). 
32
 MTS Market Data is managed by EuroMTS on behalf of the group of MTS Companies. 
33
 The complete list of data vendors includes: Bloomberg LP, Interactive Data Comstock, E-class/Class Editori, Ecowin, 
Fininfo, FTID, Il Sole 24 Ore, Infotec, Kestrel Inc., Moneyline Telerate, Reuters, Russell Mellon, SIA Cedborsa, 
Telekurs Financial, Thomson Financial, Traderforce, Valuelink Information. 
34
 For instance Traderforce’s clients are allowed to download all the data available at a certain point in time as if they 
“take a picture” of the market in that moment. 
35
 The algorithm to generate a final Reference Price for each product utilizes both traded prices and quoted best prices, 
and weights the two. 
36
 Source: our elaboration on  Monte Titoli Spa. 
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substantial change in liquidity conditions occurred in this market in the first five months of activity 
of the new pan-European network, i.e. from April to August 1999. This suggests that the latter has 
mainly captured transactions that were previously carried out over the counter. Cheung et al. (2005) 
notice that in general large numbers of market makers are active on both trading platforms, 
suggesting that there are not any competitive advantages in terms of quoting rights. Furthermore, 
they show that, although domestic MTS markets usually offer better spreads, the difference with the 
EuroMTS is small.  
 
One important feature of MTS Italy is in the different set of market makers’ obligations. In effect, 
the Italian Treasury, as mentioned above, defines a set of obligations and privileges for Specialists. 
Since the majority of market makers are also Specialists, this regulation affects the markets. In 
particular, the Treasury requirements are usually stricter with respect to the MTS ones, and, as a 
consequence, most of the market participants are committed to the Treasury’s obligations. Table 4.1 
summarizes the differences between the set of rules imposed by MTS Italy and those imposed by 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), to which are subject the securities in our sample37. 
The two regulations pursue liquidity in quite different ways. MEF rules apply to all the securities 
available on the market and, as a consequence, also to all the off-the-run issues. On the other end, 
the Management Company (i.e. MTS) periodically assigns to Primary Dealers buckets of securities 
that are “suitably differentiated in terms of liquidity, maturity date and other financial 
characteristics, for a minimum number laid down in the Rules, taking account of the need to ensure 
real competition between the Primary Dealers” (Art. 17, MTS Regulations, Governing the 
wholesale Italian and foreign government bond market, 2005). The main distinction is between the 
“liquid” bucket and the “not liquid”. For the period under examination, i.e. 2004-2006, a security is 
said to belong to the “liquid” bucket if it is listed on EuroMTS. It turns out that all the bonds in our 
sample would be assigned to the “liquid” bucket, which is also the one that is subject to the most 
severe commitments38. In effect, MTS defines precisely for each bucket bounds of maximum spread 
and minimum quoted quantity. The approach of the Italian Treasury is totally different. The 
Treasury monitors Specialists awarding points which are proportional to how the Specialist makes 
the market with respect to the other participants. For instance, points are assigned according to a 
measure of spread that is standardized with respect to the market of all the traded securities39. The 
Bank of Italy participates as well in the Treasury monitoring activity through the computation of the 
Efficiency Index. This index keeps into account the number of quoted and traded securities, and 
quoted bid-ask spread and quantities weighted for the exposition time on the order book. The 
obtained scores allow MEF to rank Specialists: ranking is one of the criteria used by Italian 
Treasury in order to select Specialists for highly remunerative services such as private placements40.  
                                                 
37
 The securities included in our samples are listed in section 4. 
38
 This is not the case for CTZs for which there is no bucket distinction. 
39
 The index is calculated as the simple average of the standardized bid – ask spreads for all the bonds quoted daily for 
at least 6 hours. For a generic primary dealer (PD) X, the standardized spread for bond i quoted for at least 6 hours is 
equal to: 
is
i
X
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i
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−
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Where Xis  is the daily average spread of the bond i, quoted for more than 6 hours by the PD X, calculated by weighting 
each bid-ask spread by the exposition time. is  and isσ are, respectively, the average and standard deviation of the 
spreads of bond i, calculated as indicated before, for all the Primary Dealers. 
 
40
 All the information related to Specialists (i.e. list, ranking and evaluation criteria) are available online at 
http://www.dt.tesoro.it/Aree-Docum/Debito-Pub/Titoli-di-/Aste-Titol/ 
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Table 4.1 MTS and Treasury rules applying to the securities comprised in our sample 
MTS MEF MTS MEF MTS MEF MTS MEF
"liquid" 
bucket 
"liquid" 
bucket 
max spread min quote 
size (mln)
BTP30 0.2 2.5
BTP10 0.07 5
BTP 5 0.05 5
BTP 3 0.04 5
CTZ 0.04+ 2.5
BTP 10 ind
− 2.5
all
−
all
Two-way 
proposals 
displayed 
for at least 5 
hours per 
day 
Points 
proport. to 
the number 
of GS 
quoted for 
at least 6 
hours
Points 
proport. to a 
standardized 
spread#
Points 
proport. to 
(%Specialist
's traded 
volume - 
average % 
of the non-
Specialist)
−
Bank of 
Italy 
"Efficiency 
Index"* and 
distributiona
l capacity 
based on 
HRF**
securities all assigned bond all all
Compliance time Bid-Ask Spread Volume Other
 
Note: The rules apply to the time span and the securities in the present research. Sources of the information are 
respectively www.mtsspa.it and “MTS Regulations - Governing the Wholesale Italian and Foreign Government Bond 
Market” for MTS and the Annex to the Public Director Decree N.140483 of December the 29th 2005 for the Italian 
Treasury. # the formula is displayed in footnote 39. + the same bound applies to “not liquid” bucket. The “liquid” bucket 
includes on-the-run and first off-the-run securities. * the index keeps into account the number of quoted and traded 
securities, and quoted bid-ask spread and quantities weighted for the exposition time. **since 2006, the parameter is 
evaluated quarterly on the basis of Harmonized Reporting Format. 
 
 
5. Data  
 
Our dataset covers transactions and proposals of the Italian medium and long term government 
bonds being traded on the MTS platforms from January 2004 to December 2006. For each day in 
the sample we have the on-the-run and the corresponding off-the-run security for each segment. The 
series of each security ends six months after it becomes the second off-the-run. Table 5.1 reports the 
exact time span for each security in the dataset. We mainly focus on medium and long term fixed 
coupon bonds (BTPs), which on December 2006 accounted for 59.93% of the outstanding 
securities. We also consider two year zero coupon bonds, CTZs, and the ten year index linked 
BTPs.  
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Table 05.1 - Data 
Security Isin 
code
on/off 
the run From
Coupon 
rate Maturity
Starting 
data
End 
sample
Numb. 
quotes
Numb. 
contracts
325682 off 17-Sep-03 5.75% 1-Feb-33 1-Jan-05 30-Nov-05
on 17-Sep-03
off 12-Oct-05
393465 on 12-Oct-05 4% 1-Feb-37 12-Oct-05 31-Dec-06
347233 off 29-Jan-04 4.25% 1-Aug-13 1-Jan-04 13-Nov-06
on 29-Jan-04
off 30-Aug-04
on 30-Aug-04
off 28-Apr-05
on 28-Apr-05
off 27-Feb-06
401958 on 27-Feb-06 3.75% 1-Aug-16 23-Feb-06 13-Nov-06
on 15-Sep-03
off 13-Apr-04
on 13-Apr-04
off 13-Jan-05
on 13-Jan-05
off 15-Jun-05
on 15-Jun-05
off 13-Mar-06
on 13-Mar-06
off 14-Sep-06
411281 on 14-Sep-06 3.75% 15-Sep-11 12-Sep-06 17-Nov-06
on 14-Jan-04
off 28-May-04
on 28-May-04
off 28-Jan-05
on 28-Jan-05
off 28-Jun-05
on 28-Jun-05
off 30-Jan-06
on 30-Jan-06
off 28-Jun-06
408524 on 28-Jun-06 4% 15-Jun-09 28-Jun-06 31-Dec-06
on 29-Mar-04
off 27-Jul-04
on 27-Jul-04
off 24-Mar-05
on 24-Mar-05
off 27-Sep-05
on 27-Sep-05
off 24-Apr-06
405105 on 24-Apr-06 30-May-08 21-Apr-06 29-Dec-06
on 18-Feb-04
off 23-Jun-06
408521 on 23-Jun-06 15-Sep-17 22-Jun-06 29-Dec-06
total 8,371,861 172,623
BTP 3
CTZ 24 m
BTP 10 ind
1-Jan-05
BTP10 
361838
371991
384453
BTP30 353515
BTP 5
31-Dec-06
13-Nov-06
13-Nov-06
13-Nov-06
5% 1-Aug-34
3%
3%
2.75%
4.25%
4.25%
3.75%
3.50%
3.50%
2.75%
3%
2.75%
2.50%
3%
1-Aug-14 27-Jan-04
1-Feb-15 27-Aug-04
1-Aug-15 27-Apr-05
15-Sep-08 1-Jan-05 28-Feb-05
15-Apr-09 13-Apr-05 31-Jul-05
15-Jan-10 11-Jan-05 13-Mar-06
15-Jun-10 13-Jun-05 17-Nov-06
15-Mar-11 13-Mar-06 17-Nov-06
15-Jan-07 14-Jan-05 28-Feb-05
1-Jun-07 28-May-05 31-Jul-05
1-Feb-08 28-Jan-05 28-Feb-06
15-Jun-08 28-Jun-05 31-Jul-06
1-Feb-09 30-Jan-06 31-Dec-06
28-Apr-06 24-Mar-04 28-Apr-06
31-Jul-06 23-Jul-04 25-Jul-06
30-Apr-07 22-Apr-05 1-Dec-06
28-Sep-07 23-Sep-05 29-Dec-06
15-Sep-14 3-Jan-05 29-Dec-06
353209
365207
379959
387292
402629
361115
367423
380485
387770
400812
364676
369706
383119
392699
362590
783,354 32,115
2,933,702
1,079,962
44,387
3,843
830,961
1,311,264 59,491
1,432,618 9,210
23,577
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Data are provided by the Italian Ministry of Treasury that collects them directly from the MTS Italy 
market. Ad hoc software allows downloading the data at the desired frequency. This data source is 
somehow unique since it shows all the quotes and the relative quantities that are active on the 
market. The implication is that we are allowed to see the complete book (all the quotes and block 
quantities. Unfortunately drip quantities are not available to us at present) whereas traders can only 
access a part of this information. Indeed, while market participants can see just the five best bid and 
ask quotes and the drip quantities insisting on them, our dataset includes all the non-repeated quotes 
and for each quote we know the whole (block) quantity. This will permit us to provide particularly 
accurate measures of the depth of the market. The point will be clearer as soon as we are 
introducing the employed liquidity measures. As we will show in the next sections, when we have 
more than five bid (ask) prices in the order book, the prices beyond the fifth are usually so low 
(high) to be irrelevant41. The minimum increment in quoted prices, i.e. the tick size, is one 
hundredth of the price for all the securities in the sample but CTZs, whose tick size is one 
thousandth of the price. Each line of the database is a “snapshot” of the information related to a 
certain security at a precise point in time. The dataset contains all the snapshots between 8:30am 
and 5.30pm at a five-minute frequency42. All the contracts are also available and they include the 
price and the sign of the trade and the trade time. Information about the number of market 
participants and the number of times a quote (either price or quantity) has been updated in the 
previous five minutes is also available. We end up with 8,371,861 proposals and 172,623 contracts. 
 
The raw dataset contains some errors due to missing records and outliers. We filtered data prior to 
performing our analysis; the filtering methodology is described in Appendix A. Transactions and 
quotes are available for both on-the-run and first off-the-run securities, where for on-the-run we 
mean the most recently auctioned security. The availability of both on and off-the-run will permit us 
to understand when, in terms of liquidity, an on-the-run security becomes the reference for its 
maturity segment, i.e. when it becomes a benchmark.  
 
6. Empirical Results 
 
In the previous sections we presented a number of conventional and new measures in order to assess 
the market liquidity. In this section we display the results of the empirical analysis. We start with 
univariate statistics focusing on the 10 year BTPs both on-the run and off-the-run. The data are at 5-
minute frequency in the case of the order book measures, and at daily frequency in the case of trade 
measures. Furthermore, we compute the price impact coefficient both on the whole sample and at 
weekly frequency. We then present the correlation coefficients among those measures in order to 
show the mutual relationships among different measures, their reciprocal consistency, their reaction 
to market conditions. We present correlation coefficients computed on data both at 5-minute 
frequency and at weekly frequency43. The analysis of summary statistics and correlation 
coefficients allows us to select a list of indicators that give a comprehensive description of the most 
important features of order book and trading data. Finally, we compare the liquidity measures 
across all the securities in the sample in order to identify the most liquid securities. Furthermore, for 
each liquidity measure we present the correlation between its values calculated on couples of 
different secutirities. This analysis allows us to evaluate commonality in liquidity. In order to 
                                                 
41
 This is not true in the case of CTZs, as we specify below. 
42
 We ran a preliminary analysis on samples selected at both 30 seconds and 10 minutes frequency. The 30 seconds 
frequency data did not show a significant amount of additional information. 
43
 Univariate statistics and correlations computed on the other securities included in the sample are available on request. 
Comparisons of univariate statistics across the securities included in the sample will be presented in section 6.4.1. 
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compare different securities, where it was necessary we transformed prices in yields. In the latter 
case, data are only at weekly frequency. 
 
When possible, we compare the values of the liquidity measures we found on MTS with the values 
of the same measures on other platforms for analogous government securities. Our yardsticks were 
one of the major Interdealer Broker electronic platforms in the U.S., BrokerTec44, and the Canadian 
Interdealer Brokered market for Government bonds45. On those markets we considered the on-the-
run 10 year maturity bond. The typical 10 year government bond in U.S., Canada and Italy have 
different outstanding. The total issued amounts are US$ 22-28 mln, CA$ 10 mln, € 20-25 mln, 
respectively, in the period 2004-2007. Taking this major difference into account, we claim that the 
comparison among the same liquidity measures is still informative. 
 
6.1. Summary statistics 
In this section we present the summary statistics of the liquidity measures for the 10 year BTPs46. 
Table 6.1 refers to the order book measures at a 5-minute frequency. Table 6.2 and 6.3 refer to trade 
measures at daily frequency, except for trade size, which is calculated on all the contracts in the 
sample. The tables can be found at the end of the present section and are split in two panels, A and 
B: The former is computed on on-the-run securities, the latter on off-the-run securities. 
 
Tightness 
The average value of the best spread amounts to 0.025 per cent of par. The dispersion around the 
average is small: The standard deviation amounts to 0.01; the third quartile is just 0.005 larger than 
the average value. The average value of both spread and weighted spread are, by definition, larger 
than the best spread. However their dispersion around the average value is even narrower than best 
spread’s dispersion47. The average best spread on MTS turns out to be larger than the best spread on 
the on-the-run 10-year maturity U.S. Treasury note48, which amounts to 1.5 per cent of par. 
However, it is greatly smaller than the best spread on the on-the-run 10-year Government of Canada 
bond, which amounts to 0.076 per cent of par49. 
 
Figures 6.1-6.4 are worked out averaging each 5-minute interval over the whole sample. The best 
spread shows a sort of U-shaped pattern. The highest value is achieved at the beginning of the day 
and it is around 4 ticks, then after 9.00 it falls at 2 ticks and it gradually rises again after 15.00. This 
is consistent with the empirical findings of Huang et al. (2002) for the USA Treasury Interdealer 
Broker market (IDB). The peak around 14.30 coincides with the opening of US financial markets. 
While the peak is common to all the measures of spread, the U shape is not so clear in the case of 
spread, and weighted spread is only slightly hump-shaped. 
 
Depth 
The quantity available for trade in the whole order book amounts, on average, to € 157 mln. 
However, only 24 per cent of it, € 37 mln, is available at the best quotes. Another 48 per cent of it is 
                                                 
44
 Data were drawn from Fleming and Mizrach (2007). 
45
 See See D’Sousa, Gaa, Yang (2003). 
46
 We will include foot notes when the evidence on the other securities in the sample is not consistent with the one on 
10 year BTPs. 
47
 Best spread is even tighter, 0.023, and less dispersed in the hours of trade concentration, i.e. between 9:00 a.m. and 
2:00 p.m.. However, spread and weighted spreads are marginally larger in the hours of trade concentration. Data on the 
other securities in the sample confirm the same evidence, particularly in the case of simple spread. We will come back 
on the rationale of the wider spread in hours of trade concentration. 
48
 See Fleming and Mizrach (2007).. 
49
 See D’Sousa, Gaa, Yang (2003). 
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available at the second best quote. The average best size on MTS turns out to be smaller than the 
best size on the on-the-run 10-year maturity U.S. Treasury note50, which amounts to $ 48 mln. 
However, it is much larger than the best size on the on-the-run 10-year Government of Canada 
bond, which amounts to $ 2.4 mln51. 
 
The dispersion of quote size around its average value is large, particularly in the case of best size. 
The coefficient of variation amounts to 0.40 in the case of total quote size and to 0.62 in the case of 
best size52. All the other measures of quote size show a large coefficient of variation but the quote 
size per participant. Data show that each market maker is available to trade € 8 mln on average and 
the dispersion around that average value is very small53. This means that the high variability of 
quote size depends on the number of dealers who participate to the market. In effect, the number of 
market participants amounts, on average, to 19 and shows a coefficient of variation which is very 
close to the coefficient of variation of total quote size54, namely 0.39. 
 
As in the case of tightness measures, depth measures show a hump-shaped pattern with lower 
values at the beginning and at the end of the day. The weighted depth, that takes into account the 
position of the quoted sizes in the book, follows the pattern of the other depth measures but at the 
same time underlining the changes in liquidity during the day. The fall in liquidity at 2:30 p.m. is 
evident in this case as well. Indeed, it turns out that at that time some market participants leave the 
market. Conversely, the participants that do not exit reduce the quoted size and widen the spreads. 
The reduction of the quote size per market participant is consistent with Kavajecz (1999), who finds 
that traders reduce depth around information events to reduce their exposure to adverse selection 
costs. In our case, the information event that daily hits the market is the opening of New York 
financial markets. This phenomenon disappears in the following 5-10 minutes. 
 
Breadth 
The average distance between best and worst quote, the steepness, amounts to 3 per cent of the mid 
price. The median value of steepness, however, is smaller, 2 per cent. Interestingly the steepness, 
which is sometimes regarded as a measure of liquidity55, seems to behave not consistently with the 
other measures of liquidity. Indeed, Figure 6.3 shows that during the hours of trade concentration, 
when the spread variables and the size variables indicate higher liquidity, we find higher values of 
the steepness and therefore apparently lower liquidity, according to one of the interpretations of this 
measure. We will elaborate on steepness and its relationship with liquidity measures later on. For 
the time being, suffice to say that, as long as we correct the steepness to keep into account the 
underlying quantities, as in the slope, we obtain a measure whose conceptual relationship with 
liquidity is clearer. The slope computes how far from best price a dealer has to depart, if he wants to 
                                                 
50
 See Fleming and Mizrach (2007). 
51
 See D’Sousa, Gaa, Yang (2003). 
52
 In hours of trade concentration quote size is even larger than on average. However, the increase in size during the 
hours of trade concentration is not uniformly distributed on all the order book. The comparison of hours of trade 
concentration and the rest of the day shows that total quote size jumps from € 113 mln to € 190 mln. On the contrary, 
best size increases only from € 31 mln to € 42 mln. Furthermore, while in the hours of trade concentration the 
dispersion of total quote size significantly falls, the coefficient of variation of best size keeps on being larger that 0.5. 
Other securities in the sample generally confirm previous evidence on quote size. However, in the case of BTP3 and 
BTP5, the increase of quote size in the hours of trade concentration is smaller. 
53
 Even during the hours of trade concentration the quote size per participant is not larger than it is on average. On the 
contrary is slightly smaller. 
54
 Most of the variability in the number of participants to market depends on the fall in market participation in morning 
and afternoon hours. In the hours of trade concentration, on average the market is made by 23 dealers. On the contrary, 
in the rest of the day, the number of market participants falls to 14. See Figure 5.4 for the graph of daily evolution of the 
number of participants. Furthermore, the dispersion in the number of market participants around those average values is 
small in the hours of trade concentration and large in the rest of the day. 
55
 See for instance Dunne et al. (2006). 
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trade € 100 mln. Therefore, the smaller the slope, the more liquid the market is. Accordingly, Figure 
6.3 shows that the slope falls in the hours of trade concentration. DS and DSS exhibit a pattern that 
is very close to the slope’s one. 
 
Trading measures 
Do the order book features fit with the trading needs revealed by market? In order to answer this 
question, trading data have to be examined. Table 6.2 shows that the average trade size amounts to 
€ 6.5 mln and the corresponding coefficient of variation is equal to 0.37. Furthermore, Table 6.3 
shows that, for most of the securities in the sample, the frequency of trades whose size is larger that 
€10 mln is smaller than 2 per cent. The comparison of trade size data with best size data shows that 
the quantity available on the book at the best price seems to be adequate to the revealed trade needs 
of the market. On average, at the best price, an amount of € 37.2 mln is available for trade, and best 
size is larger than € 20 mln in 75 per cent of cases. Even though more careful analysis of execution 
quality could be carried out, a tentative supposition could be put forward: Most of trading could 
occur at the best price. A further confirmation of the possible good execution quality comes from 
the Cost of the round trip for an amount of € 10 mln: CRT and best spread show very similar values 
of the descriptive statistics. This means that buying and selling a quantity larger than the size of 
most of the recorded trades has a cost that is equal to the best spread56. Despite previous evidence 
points to a supply of liquidity consistent with market needs, an alternative interpretation could be 
elaborated. Trade size could be affected by best size and the causality could be inverse: Most of the 
trading concentrates around € 6.5 mln because larger amounts are discouraged to appear on MTS, 
given the limited best size available. For the time being we are not able to give a final answer to the 
issue. We leave it to further investigation, probably based on additional data. 
 
Daily trading volume is not very large and, furthermore, it is exceedingly variable. The average 
daily volume amounts to € 310 mln. The corresponding coefficient of variation is equal to 0.57. 
Half of the days in the sample show a trade volume in the interval € 188 – 403 mln. Daily trading 
frequency is equal to 48, on average, and average turnover is 2.9 per cent. On the BrokerTec 
platform, daily trading volume of the on-the-run 10-year maturity U.S. Treasury note is $ 27,143 
mln, more than 60 times the trading volume on the MTS platform. The corresponding daily trading 
frequency is 10,335. On the Canadian IDB market, daily trading volume of the on-the-run 10-year 
maturity Government of Canada bond amounts to $ 193 mln, and daily trade frequency is equal to 
55. In conclusion, the trading activity on MTS is much smaller that the trading activity on one of the 
corresponding IDB electronic platform in U.S.. Nevertheless, the liquidity supplied by the order 
book on MTS seems to be relevant, and adequate for the market needs, even though smaller than 
the liquidity on the U.S. IBD market. 
 
Until now only data on on-the-run securities have been presented. Do off-the-run securities show 
the same features as the on-the-run ones? Before answering the question, let us quickly mention two 
other indicators included in Table 6.1. Market quality index is a synthetic, multidimensional 
indicator of liquidity which will be used in the following in order to compare the liquidity of bonds 
with different maturity. Its variability around the average value is smaller than the variability of 
other liquidity measures. Finally, absolute price change measures price variability and will be used 
in the following as an indicator of market conditions. Figure 6.4 shows absolute price change is 
lower in the first half of the day and it switches to a higher level after 2:00 p.m..  
 
On-the-run and off-the-run securities 
                                                 
56
 The Cost of the round trip for an amount of € 25 mln shows a mean only slightly larger than the mean of CRT10 and 
even a smaller standard deviation. 
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As expected, trading measures show a sharp difference between on-the-run and off-the-run 
securities57. In particular trading volume, trading frequency and the turnover ratio for the on-the-
run securities, Table 6.2 panel A, are on average twice as big as the off-the-run ones58, Table 6.2 
panel B. Furthermore, in the case of off-the-run securities trading volume and trading frequency are 
not only smaller, but they are also more volatile. The coefficients of variation of both trading 
volume and trading frequency are 0.57 on the on-the-run bonds and 0.80 on the off-the-run bonds. 
The unique trading measure which shows similar values in the case of on-the-run and off-the-run 
securities is trade size. Trade size is, on average, about 6-7 millions of euros for 10 year BTPs, and 
it is slightly larger on the off-the-run securities. These results indicate that trading variables could 
be helpful in the evaluation of when an on-the-run security becomes the benchmark reference for its 
maturity segment.  
 
Given the higher trading activity recorded in the case of the on-the-run securities, a more liquid 
order book could be expected for those securities59. Surprisingly, all the order book measures do not 
show any significant difference between on-the-run, Table 6.1 panel A, and off-the-run securities, 
Table 6.1 panel B. Spread measures have the same average values. Size measures are often even 
better in the case of off-the-run bonds than in the case of on-the-run bonds60. The striking difference 
in the performance of trading measures and order book measures is surprising. Spreads and quote 
size may reflect three different costs faced by market makers: Asymmetric information costs, 
inventory costs and order processing costs61. Asymmetric information costs are related to the lack 
of knowledge on the true value of the securities by the market makers. In order to prevent the lack 
of information to generate systematic losses, market makers extract information on the true value 
from the order flows62. As a consequence, the ask price quoted by the market maker, which reflect 
the expected value conditional on a buy order, is always higher than the bid price, which reflects the 
expected value conditional on a sell order. Inventory costs come from the risks associated to the 
financial portfolio held by the market makers. When a proposal posted by the market maker is hit, 
his portfolio diverges from the preferred one. Ask and bid prices are set in order to make the 
portfolio to reverse toward its preferred position. Finally, order processing costs are connected with 
the market makers operating costs. Now, the asymmetric information and the inventory costs should 
affect both on-the-run and off-the-run securities; however, the higher trading activity on the on-the-
run securities should imply smaller order processing costs for those securities. That is why tighter 
spreads, larger quote sizes and a larger number of market makers could have been expected on the 
on-the-run securities. 
 
A reasonable explanation of this evidence has to be looked for in the obligations imposed on market 
makers on the MTS platform. As already mentioned, in the MTS system market makers subscribe a 
liquidity pact and they commit to permanently quote a basket of securities for a minimum number 
of hours a day and within a maximum spread. These obligations are independent on the on-the-run 
or off-the-run status of the securities63. Furthermore, Specialists are monitored by the Italian 
                                                 
57
 As specified above, for each securities our data comprise both the on-the-run and the first off-the-run periods, and the 
first six months of the second off-the-run period. 
58
 This holds across all the securities in the sample but the index linked BTPs. 
59
 Fleming (2003) gives evidence of tighter spreads on on-the-run U.S. Treasury notes. 
60
 Data on the other securities in the sample mostly confirm the same evidence. Same evidence is conveyed by data on 
the hours of trade concentration and on the rest of the day. Only in the case of BTP30 almost all the liquidity indicators 
are better in the case of on-the-run security. 
61
 See Alonso et al. (2004). 
62
 A buy order is considered as a signal of a true value higher than the market value; the reverse is true in the case of a 
sell order. That is why market makers quote the security on the basis of its expected value conditional on the sign and 
the amount of the order flow. 
63
 This is true because all the securities under examination are included in the “liquid” bucket. In effect, the obligations 
are different for securities belonging to the ”not liquid” bucket. 
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Treasury and they compete both on the on-the-run and the off-the-run segments of the market in 
order to reach a good ranking. In effect, Tables 5.1 shows that the number of dealers on the markets 
is, on average, the same on the on-the-run and on the off-the-run securities. Apparently, MTS and 
Italian Treasury do not take into account that market makers bear higher costs in the off-the-run 
segment than in the on-the-run one. As a consequence, the number of market makers in the off-the-
run segment is higher than it would have been in the absence of obligations and monitoring, and this 
keeps down off-the-run spreads. Dealers probably compensate smaller profits on the off-the-run 
segment with higher profits on the on-the-run one, that is, in the event of no obligations and 
monitoring on the off-the-run securities the spreads on the on-the-run segment would probably be 
smaller than they are at present. Conversely, the spreads on the off-the-run segment would probably 
be larger than they are at present. 
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Table 06.1 – Summary Statistics of Order Book Measures 
mean sd p25 p50 p75 min max
Panel A: on-the-run
best spread 0.025 0.010 0.020 0.020 0.030 0 0.280
spread 0.049 0.008 0.045 0.050 0.055 0.010 0.280
weighted spread 0.046 0.007 0.043 0.045 0.048 0.010 0.283
best size 37.24 22.97 20 32.5 50 2.5 170
second size 75.77 35.10 50 77.5 102.5 3.75 215
worst size 47.02 31.18 22.5 45 70 0 195
quote size 157.09 62.66 112.5 175 205 5 310
average quote size 45.34 16.94 33.8 48 57 3.75 137.5
weighted depth 88.74 35.51 64.38 93.96 113.75 5 212.5
qte size per partic. 8.18 1.09 7.63 8.07 8.61 1 37.5
steepness 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.06
slope 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.5
DS 3.37 3.25 1.71 2.22 3.44 0.67 42.46
DSS 0.0004 0.0006 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0001 0.023
mkt quality index 9.43 3.79 6.81 9.52 11.98 0.19 33.51
CRT 10 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.29
abs price change 0.015 0.016 0.005 0.01 0.02 0 0.318
mkt participants 19.31 7.63 14 22 25 1 32
Panel B: off-the-run
best spread 0.025 0.010 0.020 0.020 0.030 0 0.280
spread 0.049 0.008 0.045 0.050 0.050 0.000 0.290
weighted spread 0.045 0.007 0.042 0.044 0.047 0.000 0.290
best size 39.15 24.32 20 32.5 53 5.0 198
second size 81.16 36.55 55 85.0 107.5 5.00 245
worst size 41.44 28.65 17.5 38 60 0 203
quote size 158.56 62.85 115.0 180 205 5 325
average quote size 46.51 16.79 35.4 49 58 5.00 135.0
weighted depth 91.53 36.34 66.67 97.08 116.67 5 229.6
qte size per partic. 8.28 1.05 7.76 8.25 8.75 2 90.0
steepness 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.06
slope 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.4
DS 3.17 3.19 1.62 2.07 3.14 0.41 31.58
DSS 0.0004 0.0005 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0000 0.020
mkt quality index 9.92 3.74 7.47 10.15 12.39 0.18 33.18
CRT 10 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.28
abs price change 0.014 0.015 0.005 0.01 0.02 0 0.318
mkt participants 19.33 7.69 14 22 25 1 31
 
Note: The table report summary statistics for the 10 year BTPs’ database at a 5-minute frequency. Panel A refers to on-
the-run and Panel B to off-the-run issues. “p” is the p-th percentile of the distribution. 
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Table 6.2 – Summary Statistics for Trading Measures 
mean sd p25 p50 p75 min max
Panel A: on-the-run
trading volume 310.01 177.63 185.72 275.32 403.05 9.94 1054.51
trading frequency 47.59 26.97 28 42 63 1 156
turnover 2.85 2.45 1.31 2.13 3.51 0.08 19.62
tradesize 6.48 2.41 5 5 10 0.5 45
Panel B: off-the-run
trading volume 176.51 142.20 83.35 144.57 230.95 4.92 1739.55
trading frequency 24.88 19.72 12 21 33 1 231
turnover 0.82 0.67 0.38 0.66 1.07 0.02 7.10
tradesize 6.90 2.51 5 5 10 1 35
 
Note: The table report summary statistics for the 10 year BTPs’ database. Trading volume, trading frequency and 
turnover are computed at a daily frequency; trade size is computed without time aggregation, i.e. on all the contracts in 
the sample. Panel A refers to on-the-run and Panel B to off-the-run issues. “p” is the p-th percentile of the distribution. 
Trading volume is expressed in millions of euros, turnover is expressed as a percentage, trading frequency and trade 
size are pure numbers. 
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Table 6.3 – Summary Statistics for Trade Size 
tradesize mean sd Perc. Cum.
2.5 60.47 60.47
5 38.62 99.09
10 0.48 99.57
25 0.04 99.61
other 0.39 100
2.5 0.35 0.35
5 66.61 66.96
10 32.68 99.64
25 0.03 99.67
other 0.33 100
2.5 12.29 12.29
5 59.74 72.03
10 27.17 99.2
25 0.04 99.24
other 0.76 100
2.5 3.28 3.28
5 59.67 62.95
10 35.74 98.69
25 0.22 98.91
other 1.09 100
2.5 71.37 71.37
5 14.11 85.48
10 11.33 96.81
25 0.16 96.97
other 3.03 100
2.5 33.05 33.05
5 29.66 62.71
10 35.47 98.18
25 0.05 98.23
other 1.77 100
6.00 3.26
2.63
6.90 3.11
4.03 3.39
BTP 10 ind
3.54 1.50
6.67 2.47
CTZ
BTP 3
BTP 5
BTP 10
6.10
BTP 30
 
Note: The table reports trade size (in mln of euros) statistics for all the securities and all the contracts in the sample.  
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Figure 6.1 – Spread Measures 
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Note: Five minute data are averaged over the whole sample of the on-the-run 10 year BTPs. The spreads are measured 
in ticks. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 – Size Measures 
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Note: Five minute data are averaged over the whole sample of the on-the-run 10 year BTPs. The depth measures that 
are not included in the figure show a similar pattern. The unit of measure is millions of euros. 
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Figure 6.3 – Steepness and Slope Measures 
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Note: Five minute data are averaged over the whole sample of the on-the-run 10 year BTPs. The DS and DSS exhibit a 
pattern that is very close to the slope one. 
 
Figure 6.4 – Market Conditions 
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Note: Five minute data are averaged over the whole sample of the on-the-run 10 year BTPs. The left scale refers to the 
absolute price change measured in ticks and the right scale to the number of market participants.  
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6.2. Further investigation: The price impact approach 
Although the descriptive analysis of the previous sections may provide an exhaustive picture of the 
Italian market liquidity, it is worthwhile to examine in a deeper way our price impact measures. As 
pointed out in section 4.2, a liquid market is a market where participants can rapidly execute large-
volume transactions with a small impact on prices. In particular, we expect that buy-trades generate 
a positive impact and sell-trades a negative impact on prices. The intuition is that directional trades 
will be associated with a larger movement in prices when markets are illiquid. The price impact 
coefficient from the Kyle model relates net trading activity to price changes. Indeed, Kyle (1985) 
develops a dynamic model of insider trading to study the informational content of prices, the 
liquidity characteristics of a speculative market, and the value of private information to an insider. 
The model is able to characterize how an informed trader would transact in order to maximize the 
value of private information. The price impact coefficient in the model reflects how much the 
market adjusts prices to reflect the information content of trades and, as a consequence, it can be 
used to characterize the liquidity of financial markets. Although the price impact does not measure 
directly the speed of convergence of prices after a trade, i.e. the resiliency of the market, it provides 
a measure of how much prices move in response to a trade. Following Fleming (2003), we now 
estimate on the whole sample four specifications of the model presented in section 3.30 in order to 
provide a general assessment of the liquidity of the Italian wholesale secondary Treasury security 
market. 
  
Table 06.4 – Price Impact of Trades for the 10 year BTPs 
  
Panel B
N mean sd p25 p50 p75 min max
price change 16,493 3.9E-05 0.027 -0.013 0 0.014 -0.314 0.212
net trading count 16,623 0.09 2.40 -1 0 1 -29 39
net trading quantity 16,623 0.44 17.12 -5 0 5 -250 280
# buy 16,623 1.05 1.64 0 1 1 0 39
# sell 16,623 0.95 1.59 0 1 1 0 33
 
Note: Panel A reports the results of five-minute price change regression on various measure of trading activity over the 
same time interval for the on-the-run 10 year BTPs. Price changes are computed using midquotes. Net trading count 
equals the number of buyer-initiated trades less the number of seller-initiated trades. Net trading volume equals buyer-
initiated less seller-initiated volume and is measured in millions of euros. Number of buy (sell) is the number of buyer 
(seller) -initiated trades. The sample period is January 1st, 2004 to November 13th, 2006. The stars specify the 
significance of coefficients: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are computed 
when the model does not pass the test for homoskedasticity. Panel B reports summary statistics for the variables in the 
regressions. 
 
Panel A 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
net trading count 0.0018*** 0.0030*** 
net trading quantity 0.00023*** -0.0002** 
# buy 0.00162*** 
# sell -0.00199*** 
constant -0.00013 -0.00007 -0.00017 0.00023 
N 16,493 16,493 16,493 16,493 
Adjusted R 2 0.025 0.022 0.026 0.025 
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Table 6.4 reports the results of the estimation procedure on the on-the-run 10 year coupon bonds64. 
In the first specification we regress price changes on the net number of trades. The regression 
coefficient is, as expected, positive and highly significant. The value of the coefficient is 0.0018, 
this means that about 6 contracts, net, move the price of 1 tick, i.e. of 0.01. The adjusted R2 is about 
0.025, meaning that just 2.5% of the variation in price changes is explained by the net trading count. 
The adjusted R2 statistics are in general low if compared with the Fleming (2003) ones. D’Souza et 
al. (2003) find comparable value for these statistics65. In specification (2) the independent variable 
is the net trading volume, the coefficient is still positive but is lower in magnitude and in 
explanatory power with respect to specification (1). The coefficient indicates that we need about 43 
millions of euros, net, to move the price of 1 tick66. In specification 3 we include both the net 
number and the net size of the trades. In this case the coefficient of the net trading quantity is 
negative. Hence controlling for the number of trades, higher volume is associated with lower price 
changes. This is consistent with Fleming (2003) findings. In the last specification we use the 
number of buy and sell trades as regressors, we find similar coefficients but with the expected 
opposite signs. The results are amplified in magnitude if we consider off-the-run securities, in 
particular the constants are also significant and the explanatory power raises to about 4%. This 
seems to confirm that the market for off-the-run securities is less liquid with respect to the on-the-
run one. 
The estimation of the models is repeated for all the securities in the sample using yields changes 
instead of price changes as dependent variable. The results are displayed in Table 6.5, we report 
only the coefficients from specification (3). The estimation results for specifications (1), (2) and (4) 
are included in the Appendix C.  
 
Table 06.5 – Price impact coefficients for all the maturity segments 
BTP 30 BTP 10 BTP 5 BTP 3 CTZ BTP 10 ind
net trading count 0.01696*** 0.00864*** 0.01467*** 0.02051*** 0.01372*** 0.05708***
net trading quantity -0.00205** -0.00044* -0.00041 -0.0007** -0.00068*** -0.0003
constant -0.00286* -0.00038 -0.00165 -0.00002 -0.00091 -0.01936*
N 3,527 15,600 8,792 11,745 14,542 1,301
Adjusted R 2 0.065 0.026 0.039 0.059 0.040 0.198
 
Note: The table reports the results of five-minute yield change regression on various measure of trading activity over 
the same time interval for on-the-run Treasury securities. Yield changes are computed using information about closing 
prices and modified durations. Net trading count equals the number of buyer-initiated trades less the number of seller-
initiated trades. Net trading volume equals buyer-initiated less seller-initiated volume and is measured in millions of 
euros. The stars specify the significance of coefficients: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors are computed when the model does not pass the test for homoskedasticity. 
 
The coefficients, when significant, have the expected signs. The magnitude of the relationships is 
higher for the less liquid segment, i.e. the index linked BTPs. This is not surprising and overall we 
can say that the 10 year index liked coupon bonds are characterized by lower trading activity and 
that trading activity, when occurs, have an impact on prices. The coefficients of net trading quantity 
are less significant than the coefficients on the net number of trades. For the very long segment of 
coupon bonds we observe a coefficient on the number of trades that is not very distant to the other 
BTPs, but we also find the highest coefficient for the size variable. This is probably due to the fact 
                                                 
64
 The estimation results for all the securities in the sample is included in the Appendix C. 
65
 We computed the net trading count price impact coefficients in terms of prices in order to make a comparison among 
MTS Italy, US interdealer broker market, as in Fleming (2003), and Canadian interdealer broker market, as in D’Souza 
et al. (2003). The comparison, based on on-the-run 10 year bonds, shows a good degree of liquidity of MTS. The US 
and Canadian price impact coefficients are respectively two and seven times the coefficients estimated on MTS data. 
66
 Interestingly, the estimated price impact is quite similar to the average value of the slope, which measures, in the 
order book, how far a trader has to move from the best quote, if he wants to trade € 100 mln. 
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that trading in 30 year BTPs is characterized by non frequent contracts of small size and as a result 
low trading volume. The adjusted R2 statistic seems to be a negative function of liquidity, it ranges 
from the 2.6% of the 10 year BTPs to the 19.8% of the index linked BTPs.  
 
Our estimates of the price impact coefficient add to a wide literature on the information content of 
the order flows67. It would be interesting to extend and deepen our analysis by comparing the price 
disclosure process on different securities and by evaluating the role of order book variables on the 
process. 
 
6.3. Comparison between Liquidity Measures 
In the previous paragraphs we presented the summary statistics for a large set of liquidity measures. 
We now want to show the mutual relationships among different measures, their reciprocal 
consistency, their reaction to market conditions. In order to do that, we computed the correlation 
coefficents among measures at 5-minute frequency and at weekly frequency. We included in the 
analysis the weekly estimation of the price impact coefficients. The correlation analysis will allow 
us, first, to better understand the degree of liquidity of the order book, second, to select a list of 
indicators that give a comprehensive description of the most important features of order book and 
trading data. The selection will follow the criteria specified in Fleming (2003): A liquidity measure 
should directly quantify the transaction costs, it should behave consistently with market 
participants’ view about liquidity, it should be easy to calculate and be available on a real-time 
basis.  
 
Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 at the end of the section contain correlation coefficients for measures 
respectively at a 5-minute and at weekly frequency for the on-the-run 10 year BTPs68. As in 
Fleming (2003) we include the set of trading measures only in the table at weekly frequency. We do 
not include them in the table at daily frequency because trade measures have a smoother behaviour 
at weekly frequency. Summary statistics at weekly frequency of all the measures used in the 
correlation analysis are reported in Table 6.6. 
 
The presentation of the empirical evidence will follow a triangular structure, which is analogous 
with the structure of any matrix of correlation coefficients. We will first present the reciprocal 
correlation among market condition indicators. Second, we will comment the reciprocal correlations 
among tightness indicators, and their correlations with market condition indicators. Afterwards, we 
will show the reciprocal correlations among depth indicators, and their correlations with market 
condition and tightness indicators. Subsequently, we will focus on the correlation between breadth 
indicators and market condition, tightness and depth indicators; and so on. In other words, any time 
we comment a new class of indicators, we analyse the correlation of those indicators with the ones 
previously presented. 
 
Market conditions 
We will analyse the correlation of all our liquidity measures with two indicators of market 
conditions. This will allow us to evaluate the reaction of the order book and of trading activity to 
changes in the trading environment. The two indicators we will focus on are price volatility and the 
number of market participants. The former indicator mainly catches the process of price discovery. 
When news hit the market, they are incorporated in the prices and cause an increase of price 
volatility. In this process, asymmetries of information can have a central role and determine the 
behaviour of traders and market makers. A large literature on price discovery in the presence of 
                                                 
67
 See, among other, Cheung, de Jong and Rindi (2005), Brandt and Kavajecz (2004), Green (2004). 
68
 The tables for the remaining securities are available on request. 
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asymmetric information has shown that trading data, in particular order flows, convey information 
and contribute to determine prices. On the contrary, the role of order book data in the process of 
price discovery has not been explored to a great extent69. Investigating the connection between 
order book and price discovery is beyond the scope of the present research. However, our 
correlation analysis can be considered as a preliminary step towards further research. In this 
framework, we will be unable to identify casual relationships. Nevertheless, our descriptive analysis 
will allow us to highlight interesting co-movements among order book data, trading data and price 
volatility. 
 
The number of market participants, that is the number of market makers present on the market, is 
considered by us as an additional indicator of market conditions, in particular it would measure the 
degree of competition among market makers. Therefore, we are interested in checking how the 
liquidity measures react to a variation in market competition. We are aware, however, that both the 
number of market participants and price volatility can not be considered as exogenous variables 
which affect order book data from outside. In effect, the decision of the dealers to participate to the 
market is taken together with the decisions on their proposals about prices and quantity. Therefore, 
the interpretation of the number of participation is not unambiguous. It is not only an indicator of 
market competition, but also an endogenous variable. The endogeneity of the number of 
participants is confirmed by its negative correlation, -0.23, with price volatility at 5-minute 
frequency. In periods of high volatility, when asymmetric information is presumably higher, some 
market makers temporarily leave the market in order to reduce the risk of adverse selection70. This 
pattern is clearly shown in Figure 6.4. Furthermore, price volatility depends on trading activity, as 
mentioned above, and, therefore it is an endogenous variable. However, we will consider it as an 
indicator of uncertainty on the true value of the security. 
 
Tightness 
As to the reciprocal correlations among the three measures of spread, a strong correlation is 
detected between spread and weighted spread. On the contrary, best spread show a smaller 
correlation with the other two measures. 
 
We now focus on the connections between tightness measures and market condition indicators. The 
increase in price volatility makes spreads larger. Information uncertainty turns the market makers 
more cautious. The effect is particularly evident on weekly data. Evidently, price volatility modifies 
the behaviour of market makers especially when is persistent. Furthermore, when the number of 
market participants rises, best spread and weighted spread show a fall, which is particularly evident 
in the former case. This is true even on weekly averages and, therefore, it is not caused by the 
variability of the number of operators along the day. Evidently, the number of participants is truly a 
measure of market competition. On the contrary, only weak correlation is detected between spread 
and number of market participants at 5-minute frequency. We will later elaborate about the 
difference between the three measures of spread. 
 
Depth 
Total quote size is positively correlated with all the other measures of size. However, the correlation 
it is very high only with second size, average size and weighted depth. At 5-minute frequency, the 
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 Campbell and Hendry (2007), Mizrach and Neely (2005), Green (2004), Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) examine the 
price discovery process on the US government security market. Cheung, de Jong and Rindi (2005), Menkveld, Cheung 
and de Jong (2005), Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2007) study the price discovery process on the euro sovereign debt 
market. Fleming and Mizrach (2007) explore the role of order book data on the price discovery process on the US 
government security market. 
70
 At weekly frequency the correlation is smaller and not statistically significant. Evidently, the decision of leaving the 
market is always temporary. 
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correlation between best size and total size is 0.45, while the correlation between second size and 
total size amounts to 0.83 and the correlation between total size and rest of the book is equal to 
0.63. Evidently, when quote size changes, its variations are not uniformly distributed on the order 
book71. Furthermore, both at 5-minute frequency and at weekly frequency best and worst size are 
negatively correlated. This confirms that quote size is not uniformly distributed, and makes it 
interesting to explore the divergent behaviour of best and worst size.  
 
Before examining the correlations of depth measures with the other indicators, the peculiar 
behaviour of quote size per operator has to be stressed. At 5-minute frequency the quote size per 
operator is either weakly and positively correlated or uncorrelated with the other measures of quote 
size. This confirms the evidence we commented in the previous section: the amount quoted by each 
dealer is quite stable; most of the variability of total quote size comes from the number of dealers 
who participate in the market. At weekly frequency, however, quote size per participant is highly 
and positively correlated with all the other measures of size. Evidently, the amount quoted by each 
market maker is quite stable during the day, but, in the more liquid weeks, all the quote size 
indicators become larger72. 
 
We now turn to examine the relationships between size measures and other indicators. First, at 5-
minute frequency when price volatility increases all the quote size measures worsen but the quote 
size per operator. Therefore, as expected, a jump in price uncertainty causes a rise in spreads and a 
fall in quote size. However, the impact of volatility on the order book is only temporary. In effect, 
on weekly data no clear evidence of correlation between volatility and trade measures is present. 
Second, all the size measures are highly correlated with the number of market participants but the 
quote size per participant. Once again, this confirms that the number of participants explain most of 
the variability of quote size. 
 
The analysis of the correlation between depth measures and best spread casts new light on the 
quality of the order book and on the distribution of quote size. At weekly frequency, best spread is 
negatively correlated with all the measures of size. This shows the consistency between best spread 
and size measures: When best spread shows higher market liquidity, quote size measures point to 
the same direction. However, data at 5-minute frequency hide a surprise: The correlation between 
best size and best spread becomes positive73. This means that when the market becomes more liquid 
and quote size increases and best spread shrinks, quote size at the best prices falls. Therefore, the 
behaviour of best size is peculiar: It is not strongly correlated with total quote size and it is 
inconsistent with best spread. 
 
Finally, the correlations between depth measures and the other two measures of spread tell us 
something interesting about the differences among spread measures. At 5-minute frequency the 
correlations between weighted spread and total quote size is small, the correlation between 
weighted spread and best size has the opposite sign with respect to the correlation of best spread, 
and the correlation between spread and all the size measures are close to zero. In order to give an 
explanation to the peculiar behaviour of spread and weighted spread, we will go back to it later, 
after elaborating about steepness.  
                                                 
71
 See note 52 for similar evidence, based on the comparison between hours of trade concentration and rest of the day. 
However, a low correlation coefficient between total quantity and best size is found even in the hours of trade 
concentration. 
72
 Notice, however, that most of the variability of size measures is concentrated at 5-minute frequency. Table 5.6 shows 
that the coefficient of variations at weekly frequency of quote size amounts to 0.11, whereas at 5-minute frequency the 
same coefficient was 0.40. 
73
 The positive correlation is not caused by the evolution of the two measures throughout the day. The correlation  
becomes even larger in the hours of trade concentration. 
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Breadth 
In the previous section we already pointed out that the behaviour of steepness during the day is at 
odds with the behaviour of spread and size measures. Correlation analysis confirms it: Steepness 
increases when best spread falls and quote size rises. Steepness is not consistent with the other 
measures of liquidity. What drives steepness? How can the rise of steepness at moments when the 
market seems to be more liquid be explained? The analysis of simple correlations provides 
interesting insights, even though it does not allow to answer thoroughly those questions. A 
multivariable econometric approach could be very helpful. 5-minute frequency data shows relevant 
correlation of steepness with the number of market makers, 0.51, with total quote size, 0.48, and, 
what is more, with worst size, 0.73. That evidence seems to be connected with the evolution of the 
order book during the day: in the hours of trade concentration, when the number of market makers 
increases, quote size increases, but it is not distributed uniformly over the quotes. On the contrary, 
the off-the-best quotes are the most affected by the additional quote size. Furthermore, new quotes 
are added at end of the order book, and this makes the order book steeper.  
 
The correlation of steepness with quote size and number of market makers is strongly connected to 
the evolution of the order book throughout the day. In effect, on weekly data those correlations 
disappear. However, when the attention is focused only on the hours of trade concentration, another 
interesting evidence comes out: The correlation of steepness with quote size and market participants 
is low, as expected. However, a strong negative correlation with best spread, -0.54, and best size, -
0.43, emerges, along with a strong positive correlation with worst size, 0.64. This seems to confirm 
what we already pointed out about low quality of the order book. In the hours of trade 
concentration, the tightening of best spread is not accompanied by an increase in best size. On the 
contrary, best size is reduced, the order book becomes steeper and the quantities available for trade 
are moved to the end of the order book. 
 
Finally, we come back to the differences among different measures of tightness. The peculiar 
behaviour of steepness and the low quality of the order book help us to find an interpretation of 
those differences. Both at 5-minute and at weekly frequency simple spread and weighted spread 
have a large and positive correlation with steepness. When steepness increases, and at the same time 
best spread shrinks, the other two measures of spread rise. Behind the inconsistent behaviour of 
spreads there is simple algebra. The computation of both spread and weighted spread draws on all 
the quotes in the order book: The simple spread is the difference between the average of bid quotes 
and the average of ask quotes; weighted spread is the difference between the weighted average of 
those quotes. As a consequence, if steepness increases and best spread does not move, both the 
simple and the weighted average of bid quotes fall and, at the same time, both the simple and the 
weighted average of the ask quote rise. This explains the algebraic positive relationship of steepness 
with both spread and weighted spread74. In the end, the divergent behaviour of the spread measures 
can be interpreted as the outcome of what we called the low quality of the order book: As the best 
spread tightens and total size increases, best size falls and the order book becomes steeper. And the 
steeper order book causes a jump of simple and weighted spread. 
 
Slope 
Our expectations about the behaviour of slope measures were mixed. On one hand, slope is a 
measure of liquidity. Namely, the smaller the slope, the more liquid the market. On the other hand, 
                                                 
74
 Actually, the link between spreads and steepness is complicated by the evidence of a negative correlation between 
best spread and steepness. Therefore, as steepness rises, simple and weighted spread are affected by two opposite 
effects: On one hand, the best spread fall tends to shrink them; on the other hand, the steepness rise enlarges them. 
Evidently, the latter effect prevails on the former one. 
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given that steepness appears at the numerator of slope75, we could expect that slope could follow the 
same pattern as steepness and show an inconsistent behaviour with respect to other measures of 
liquidity. As a matter of fact, the evidence from correlation analysis shows that slope does not 
follow the same pattern as steepness. In effect, the correlation between steepness and slope is 
negative, slope behaves consistently with the other measures of liquidity and it decreases when best 
spread tightens, or when total quote size and best size increase. Furthermore, the increase of the 
number of market makers causes the slope to drop, as the other liquidity measures do; and when 
price volatility rises, slope tends to rise as well, at least at 5-minute frequency.  
 
As to the differences among slope, DS and DSS, our evidence shows their similar correlation 
coefficients. Given that slope is easier to compute and it is available on a real-time basis, we 
definitively prefer it to the others. 
 
Market quality index and CRT 
Both market quality index and CRT turn up to be good synthetic indicators of market liquidity. 
They show the expected correlation with spreads, quote size measures, slope, market participants 
and volatility, even though the effect of volatility on liquidity is only temporary, as usual. 
Furthermore, they are reciprocally consistent: When market quality index improves, the cost of 
round drip falls. 
 
The unique contradictory correlations of CRT and market quality index are the ones with best 
spread and with steepness. But this is not surprising after what we wrote about the low quality of 
the order book. CRT shows a positive correlation with best size at 5-minute frequency. This means 
that when best size rises the cost of round trip increases, and the two liquidity indicators point at 
different directions. The evidence has reasonably to be related to the positive correlation between 
best size and best quote: Given that larger best size causes a larger best spread, a positive 
correlation between best spread and CRT turns out. In effect, at weekly frequency, when the 
correlation between best spread and best size changes sign, the same occurs to the correlation 
between CRT and best size. 
 
Furthermore, at 5-minute frequency market quality index is only slightly correlated with steepness, 
and this is good, given that steepness does not behave as a liquidity measure. However, CRT is 
negatively and quite strongly correlated with steepness, and this adds up to the previous evidence 
about contradictory outcomes of steepness with respect to other liquidity measures. At weekly 
frequency, however, a switch occurs and CRT shows almost no correlation with steepness and, on 
the contrary, market quality index exhibits a strong negative correlation. 
 
Trading measures 
Trading measures show the expected reciprocal correlations. A larger trade volume is combined 
with larger turnover and smaller price impact coefficients76. Furthermore, trade size confirms to be 
quite constant and not very affected by market evolution: It is not significantly correlated with 
trading volume. As a consequence, trading frequency is highly correlated with trading volume. 
However, the relevant issue is: Are the trading measures consistent with order book measures? 
 
No clear and general relationship emerges between trading and order book measures. For instance, 
trading volume and trading frequency have no significant correlation with spread measures. 
However, an increase in trading frequency or in turnover has a negative impact on most of the quote 
                                                 
75
 The other two measures close to slope, DS and DSS, exhibit an algebraic direct relationship with steepness as well. 
76
 On the off-the-run securities, though, the correlations between trade volume and price impact coefficients are small 
and not significantly different from nil. 
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size measures, the number of market participants, the steepness and the slope of the order book, the 
market quality index77. On the contrary, an increase in trade size or a fall in the price impact 
coefficients is combined with tighter spreads, larger quote size and market participants, reduced 
steepness and slope, a higher market quality index. 
 
In the end, trading measures can be split in two groups: The first group comprises trading volume, 
trading frequency, turnover. They either show no correlation with order book measures, or are 
combined with less liquid order book. The second group comprises trade size and price impact 
coefficients. They move in the same directions as the other liquidity indicators. 
 
 
Table 6.6 – Weekly Summary Statistics 
N mean sd p25 p50 p75 min max
best spread 145 0.025 0.002 0.023 0.025 0.026 0.020 0.034
spread 145 0.049 0.003 0.047 0.049 0.051 0.042 0.063
weighted spread 145 0.046 0.003 0.044 0.045 0.048 0.040 0.060
best size 145 37.10 5.64 34 37.7 41 19.5 50
second size 145 74.98 12.02 68 75.1 83.0 34.25 101
worst size 145 46.49 9.85 39.1 47 54 17 73
quote size 145 156.45 16.94 147.2 158 167 98 200
average quote size 145 45.25 6.03 41.3 46 49 23.78 58.6
weighted depth 145 88.38 10.69 82.31 90.19 95.55 49 115.5
qte size per partic. 145 8.16 0.58 7.77 8.10 8.42 7 10.4
steepness 145 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03
slope 145 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.1
DS 145 3.50 0.67 3.05 3.29 3.76 2.55 7.14
DSS 145 0.0004 0.0001 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.001
mkt quality index 145 9.41 1.65 8.18 9.64 10.41 3.94 13.13
CRT 10 145 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
abs price change 145 0.01 0.00 0.0129 0.01459 0.01604 0.00831 0.023
mkt participants 145 19.26 1.56 18.61 19.43 20.33 13.71 22.26
trade size 145 6.50 0.47 6.11 6.52 6.91 5.45 7.49
trading volume 145 368.91 128.44 281.68 355.54 446.47 99.84 678.91
trading frequency 145 56.60 19.70 40.88 55.17 68.69 16.38 106.41
turnover ratio 145 3.36 2.20 1.81 2.61 4.25 0.55 12.65
NTQ 145 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0006 0.0014
NTC 145 0.0025 0.0021 0.0011 0.0021 0.0037 -0.0033 0.0101
 
Note: The table report summary statistics for the 10 year on-the-run BTPs’ database at a weekly frequency. NTQ and 
NTC are the price impact coefficients coming from weekly regression of five-minute price change on respectively the 
net trading quantity and the net number of trades over the same time interval. Price changes are computed using 
midquotes and are measured in terms of prices. “p” is the p-th percentile of the distribution. 
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 No significant correlation is found between trading frequency and order book measures on the off-the-run securities, 
though. 
Table 6.7 – Correlations at a 5-minute frequency 
best 
spread spread
weigh. 
spread best size
second 
size
worst 
size
quote 
size
aver. qte 
size
weigh. 
depth
qte size 
per 
partic.
steepnes
s
slope DS DSS mkt qual ind CRT 10
abs 
price 
change
best spread 1
spread 0.6789* 1
weighted spread 0.7019* 0.8433* 1
best size 0.1988* 0.1799* -0.1382* 1
second size -0.2475* -0.0041 -0.1857* 0.2479* 1
worst size -0.6980* -0.0224* 0.0814* -0.2026* 0.3168* 1
quote size -0.4081* 0.0142* -0.1626* 0.4471* 0.8523* 0.6334* 1
average quote size -0.2301* -0.1177* -0.2230* 0.6094* 0.8258* 0.3165* 0.8908* 1
weighted depth -0.1949* 0.0765* -0.1897* 0.7479* 0.7791* 0.3126* 0.9215* 0.9302* 1
qte size per partic. -0.1121* -0.1882* -0.2258* 0.1124* 0.0661* -0.0176* 0.0886* 0.1395* 0.1161* 1
steepness -0.5697* 0.3900* 0.1986* -0.1603* 0.2659* 0.7279* 0.4770* 0.0566* 0.2311* -0.1397* 1
slope 0.4177* 0.1513* 0.1907* -0.2247* -0.6315* -0.4322* -0.6863* -0.6526* -0.6054* -0.1165* -0.3048* 1
DS 0.2875* -0.0377* 0.1673* -0.2888* -0.6422* -0.3955* -0.7092* -0.6355* -0.6498* -0.0644* -0.3447* 0.6480* 1
DSS 0.3390* 0.1187* 0.2204* -0.2180* -0.5723* -0.3507* -0.4857* -0.4698* -0.4541* -0.2593* -0.2274* 0.7650* 0.6532* 1
mkt quality index -0.3188* -0.3264* -0.3204* 0.4603* 0.7596* 0.3132* 0.7939* 0.9491* 0.7978* 0.1768* -0.0659* -0.6242* -0.5625* -0.4393* 1
CRT 10 0.9666* 0.5479* 0.5935* 0.2100* -0.2847* -0.6710* -0.4433* -0.2434* -0.2134* -0.0741* -0.5355* 0.4615* 0.3114* 0.3473* -0.3428* 1
abs price change 0.1401* 0.0502* 0.1139* -0.1069* -0.1755* -0.1174* -0.2190* -0.1973* -0.2064* -0.0028 -0.0932* 0.1565* 0.1452* 0.1383* -0.1793* 0.1252* 1
mkt participants -0.4006* 0.0403* -0.1308* 0.4184* 0.8243* 0.6278* 0.9724* 0.8542* 0.8882* -0.0930* 0.5066* -0.6744* -0.7015* -0.4648* 0.7478* -0.4257* -0.2251*
 
Note: The table reports correlation coefficients for the 10 year on-the-run BTPs. The measures are calculated at a 5-minute frequency. The * indicates that the correlation 
coefficients are significant at the 5% level or better.  
 
Table 06.8 – Weekly Correlations 
Note: The table reports correlation coefficients for the 10 year on-the-run BTPs. The measures are calculated weekly. 
The * indicates that the correlation coefficients are significant at the 5% level or better. 
  
 
best 
spread spread
weigh. 
spread best size
second 
size
worst 
size
quote 
size
aver. qte 
size
weigh. 
depth
qte size 
per 
partic.
steepnes
s
slope
best spread 1
spread 0.6148* 1
weighted spread 0.7115* 0.9262* 1
best size -0.2862* -0.5840* -0.7161* 1
second size -0.2266* -0.6386* -0.6501* 0.7891* 1
worst size -0.3014* 0.3863* 0.3460* -0.2828* -0.2874* 1
quote size -0.4602* -0.4287* -0.5094* 0.7325* 0.8041* 0.2972* 1
average quote size -0.2601* -0.6979* -0.6513* 0.8185* 0.9514* -0.2072* 0.8286* 1
weighted depth -0.3859* -0.5724* -0.6608* 0.9031* 0.9089* -0.0187 0.9430* 0.9235* 1
qte size per partic. -0.2900* -0.3160* -0.3523* 0.5828* 0.5767* 0.2350* 0.7382* 0.6258* 0.7046* 1
steepness -0.1091 0.6874* 0.5154* -0.5127* -0.5911* 0.6968* -0.1701* -0.6540* -0.4066* -0.2202* 1
slope 0.4296* 0.6293* 0.5928* -0.6443* -0.7377* -0.0864 -0.7922* -0.8184* -0.7956* -0.5863* 0.4499* 1
DS 0.3591* 0.6220* 0.6628* -0.7450* -0.8423* 0.105 -0.7882* -0.8420* -0.8522* -0.4915* 0.4468* 0.8797*
DSS -0.3338* -0.149 -0.1896* 0.0426 -0.0766 0.1847* 0.0718 -0.0295 0.0353 0.1271 0.103 -0.0876
mkt quality index -0.3868* -0.8362* -0.7673* 0.7856* 0.8879* -0.2760* 0.7323* 0.9533* 0.8498* 0.6024* -0.7394* -0.7875*
CRT 10 0.9507* 0.5768* 0.6759* -0.3087* -0.2013* -0.3298* -0.4590* -0.2470* -0.3865* -0.3764* -0.0495 0.4449*
abs price change 0.3082* 0.2579* 0.3393* -0.1171 -0.0072 0.1602 0.0422 0.0107 -0.0229 0.0938 -0.0217 -0.0483
mkt participants -0.4130* -0.3659* -0.4576* 0.5653* 0.6660* 0.1850* 0.7876* 0.6518* 0.7489* 0.1819* -0.0855 -0.6685*
trade size -0.0896 -0.3025* -0.2956* 0.5163* 0.5849* -0.0057 0.5724* 0.6010* 0.6002* 0.5951* -0.3326* -0.5021*
trad volume -0.1266 -0.0173 -0.0527 -0.0331 -0.1182 0.043 -0.0672 -0.1092 -0.0722 0.0383 0.1091 0.0678
trad frequency -0.102 0.0411 0.0101 -0.1670* -0.2464* 0.0195 -0.2144* -0.2473* -0.2221* -0.1305 0.1918* 0.1928*
turnover -0.1242 0.2961* 0.3164* -0.4791* -0.5187* 0.4149* -0.2781* -0.4752* -0.4273* -0.0987 0.5008* 0.3270*
NTQ -0.0787 0.1714* 0.1654* -0.1849* -0.2119* 0.3040* -0.0328 -0.1912* -0.1326 0.0796 0.2401* 0.0635
NTC -0.0833 0.1539 0.1482 -0.1404 -0.1609 0.3237* 0.0299 -0.1345 -0.0737 0.1309 0.2143* 0.017
DS DSS mkt qual ind CRT 10
abs 
price 
change
mkt 
partic.
trade 
size
trad 
volume
trad 
freq. turnover NTQ NTC
DS 1
DSS 0.009 1
mkt quality index -0.7671* 0.0378 1
CRT 10 0.3179* -0.3660* -0.4080* 1
abs price change 0.0446 -0.1392 -0.0527 0.2557* 1
mkt participants -0.7498* -0.0172 0.5386* -0.3410* -0.0078 1
trade size -0.4890* 0.1261 0.5603* -0.1621 0.1613 0.3052* 1
trad volume 0.0532 -0.0189 -0.0827 -0.1044 0.01 -0.1441 0.1258 1
trad frequency 0.1572 -0.0415 -0.2194* -0.0404 -0.0509 -0.2100* -0.1099 0.9626* 1
turnover 0.4538* 0.152 -0.4451* -0.0797 0.0421 -0.3447* -0.1997* 0.4039* 0.4601* 1
NTQ 0.1537 -0.0091 -0.1810* -0.1234 0.1800* -0.1234 -0.2138* -0.3607* -0.3423* -0.0323 1
NTC 0.1075 0.0401 -0.132 -0.1317 0.2409* -0.0808 -0.1182 -0.3638* -0.3663* -0.0502 0.9700* 1
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6.4. Liquidity Comparison Across Securities 
In this section we perform a direct comparison of the liquidity across the securities in the sample. 
We focus on the on-the-run issues78. Since many measures are function of prices we need to exploit 
the relationship between prices and duration79 to express these measures in yields. By doing so we 
make securities with different maturities reciprocally comparable. Conversely, the measures that 
depend only on the quote quantities can be compared directly. In particular, best spread, quoted 
spread, weighted spread, steepness, slope, DS e DSS and absolute price change are divided by the 
product between the daily closing modified duration and the daily closing price. Market quality 
index is now simply the ratio between the average quote size and the yield version of the spread, 
and price impact coefficients, NTQ and NTC, have been estimated once again, computing the 
dependent variable in terms of yields. We work out both summary statistics and correlation 
coefficients at weekly frequency.  
6.4.1. Summary statistics 
In the tables at the end of the section we compare the liquidity measures across the different 
maturity segments. We start by commenting the market condition measures. Market volatility 
ranges from 0.0013 for the CTZs to the 0.002 for the 5 year BTPs. The number of market 
participants goes from 8.8 in the case of 10 year index linked BTPs, to 19.3 in the case of 10 year 
BTPs. CTZs and 30 year BTPs are in lower side of the range. 
 
With respect to best spread, the 10 year BTP is the most liquid security, followed by CTZs, 5 year 
BTPs, 30 year BTPs and 3 year BTPs. The 10 year index linked BTPs have the wider spread, and, 
in general, they have the worst performance whatever measure we consider. Surprisingly, the 30 
year BTPs gains the fourth position. This result is robust if we look at the median of the 
distributions. 
 
Turning to the depth measures, we note that the medium and long term BTPs quote larger quantities 
in the first two levels of the book and smaller in the rest of it. The very long term BTPs, the zero 
coupon bonds and the index linked bonds exhibit an opposite pattern and in general they have a 
lower quote size. Therefore, the less liquid segments have a quote size that is comparable to the 
most liquid segments, but the distribution of depth is more concentrated in the lower part of the 
book. This implies that quote size alone is not a good proxy of liquidity and we have to consider the 
quantity position in the book. Focusing on the medium and long term BTPs, namely BTP3, BTP5 
and BTP10, the peculiar behaviour of depth measures turns up. Although the amount of quote size 
is comparable among the three securities, average quote size and quote size per participant is higher 
the shorter the maturity. On BTP3 the number of market participants is smaller than on BTP10, 
however each of them, on average, posts an amount higher than the amount posted on BTP10. 
Furthermore, the average quote size is higher on BTP3 then on BTP10, and both best size and 
second size are larger on BTP3 than on BTP10. In all the previous cases BTP5 falls between BTP3 
and BTP10. The evidence adds up to what we called the low quality of the order book. On the long 
side of the BTP market, tighter spreads are associated with smaller size on the top of the book, 
smaller quote size per market participant, smaller average quote size.  
 
We included in our analysis the quote frequency, which is the number of different prices quoted80 
(Table 6.12). Quote frequency can be interpreted as a measure of market breadth. In the medium 
and long term segment for the BTPs we find, on average, three quotes. This implies that the whole 
                                                 
78
 In the Appendix C we include the statistics for the off-the-run issues. 
79
 We use daily data on the modified duration provided by Bloomberg and Reuters. 
80
 Quote frequency matches with quote frequency in D’Souza and Gaa (2004) and corresponds to 2 bidnaskn + . 
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market is visible to each market participant through the MTS page that reports the best five quotes 
and the corresponding quantities. On the contrary, in the very long term BTP segment, i.e. the 30 
year one, we have around two times the quotes of the other BTPs. Furthermore, the CTZs show on 
average 10 different quotes; hence, only half of the market is visible. The larger quote frequency for 
the CTZs is partly explained by the pricing conventions. In fact, the CTZs are quoted in tenths of a 
point, while all the other securities in our sample are quoted in points, where a point equals one per 
cent of par81. Evidently, a smaller tick size increases the quote frequency. However, quote 
frequency does not depend only by pricing conventions. The 10 year index linked BTPs are quoted 
in hundredths of one per cent of par, nevertheless, they also show a high quote frequency. 
Therefore, a high quote frequency also gives evidence of a lack of competition among market 
makers.  
 
From the perspective of steepness, slope, DS and DSS, the 10 year BTPs show always the lower 
values and then the higher liquidity. The 30 year BTPs confirm their good performances in that they 
have the second lowest steepness and slope. The zero coupon and the index linked bonds achieve 
the worst values, this is partly due to their less concentrated book. In general, these measures 
provide similar information. It is interesting to note that the steepness, that in the previous sections 
we proved to be not a good proxy of liquidity, behaves correctly in the univariate case, that is, it is 
smaller for the most liquid securities. This is an indirect proof of the importance of the correlation 
analysis as a tool to distinguish the most informative measures of liquidity. The last measure in the 
table is a variation of the market quality index, and we call it market quality index 2. In particular at 
the numerator we substitute the average quote size with the quote size. The aim of the new measure 
is to allow a better comparison of market quality index across securities. In effect, CTZs are 
characterized by larger quote frequency, and, as a consequence, smaller average quote size and 
smaller values of the usual market quality index. The 10 year BTPs show the higher value of market 
quality index 2, followed by the 5 year and the 3 year BTPs. The 30 year BTPs and the CTZs show 
values of the index that are one third of the 10 year ones. The index linked bonds perform even 
worse.  
 
Let us finally consider our measures of trading. As expected the 10 year BTPs show the best 
performances in terms of volumes and contracts. Moreover, trading in these securities produces a 
low impact on prices. This point is particularly evident: trading in the 5 year and 3 year BTPs 
produces price impacts that are twice the 10 year BTPs ones. The difference with respect to the 
other securities is even larger. The 3 year BTPs are characterized by contracts that are less frequent 
but with higher mean trade size and higher price impact with respect to the 10 year and 5 year 
BTPs. CTZs are traded frequently and with small trade size, this could be a signal of the fact that 
this kind of securities is considered as a monetary instrument. The other trading variables exhibit 
values, in the case of CTZs, that are close to the ones shown by medium and short term BTPs. The 
30 year BTPs are traded twice as frequently as the 10 years index linked BTPs are, but for half of 
the size. As a result trading volume and turnover ratio are very similar for those segments. The 
index linked securities are the less traded, and they show price impact coefficients that are between 
six and seven times the 10 year BTPs ones.  
 
To sum up, the medium and long term BTPs seem to represent the most liquid segments. As for the 
variables that exploit order book information, the 10 year BTP is the most liquid security with 
respect to spread and steepness measures. It is also the most active segment of the market. 
However, it has not the higher quote size on the top of the book and on average the 3 year and the 5 
year BTPs seems to have larger depth. The CTZs have a good performance in terms of best spread, 
but they are characterized by a more dispersed book. The very long term BTPs show performances 
                                                 
81
 In other words, the minimum price difference, i.e. the tick,  is 0.01 for the BTPs and 0.001 for the CTZs. 
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that are better than expected with respect to the order book measures. On the other hand, trading 
activity in this segment is still low and only the index linked bonds exhibit lower figures. This latter 
segment is not surprisingly the worst in terms of most of the employed measures. 
 
Till now we have focused on the on-the-run securities. As a robustness check we now consider the 
difference between on-the-run and off-run securities. It turns out that this difference is always 
small82. In general, we have that the on-the-run securities show a higher liquidity in terms of order 
book measures. Indeed, these better performances are small in magnitude and they are clearer for 
the more complex measures that take into account both prices and quantities. The 5 year BTP is, 
among the most liquid BTPs, the security with higher variability in the comparative analysis. With 
respect to the trade measures, the liquidity is higher for the on-the-run securities and this pattern is 
clearer for the 10 year and 3 year BTPs. The 5 year BTPs and the CTZs show a higher mean trading 
volume when they are off-the-run. If we look at the median values this result holds only for the 
CTZs. 
6.4.2. Correlation analysis 
Following D’Souza et al. (2003) we work out the correlation coefficients among the segments. For 
the sake of exposition we present the results for a subset of our measures83.  
 
The absolute price change is, among all the measures, the one that shows the highest magnitude in 
the correlation coefficients. The coefficients are particularly high for the long and very long term 
segments. The participation in the market for the different segments is also positively correlated and 
significant. 
 
Looking at the order book measures, we note that the 10 year BTPs are in general positively related 
with the other BTPs, the correlation coefficients are higher with the 30 year and 5 year BTPs for the 
spread and the slope variables and with the 3 year BTPs for the size measures. In general, the 
correlation coefficients are positive for the BTPs; this is consistent with the hypothesis of 
integration of these segments. However, as long as we consider the CTZs, we find negative and 
significant correlation coefficients between them and the 5 year BTPs in the spread measures and in 
the quote size per participant. The coefficients are negative, but not significant, if we look at 
trading volume and trading frequency. 
 
The coefficients regarding the trading measures are always positive when significant, the 
relationships are stronger among the BTPs. This is consistent with the previous findings. The price 
impact measures more often exhibit significant correlations84. The index linked bonds are scarcely 
related to the other securities in the sample.  
                                                 
82
 The tables regarding the off-the-run sample are included in Appendix C. 
83
 The remaining tables are available in Appendix C. 
84
 With respect to the variables not included in this paragraph, we can say that the second size and quoted size measures 
show positive and significant correlations. The worst size and the quote size per participant are positive when 
significant. The slope, DS and DSS measures seldom are significant. 
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Table 06.9 – Comparison of Market Condition Indicators across Securities 
# obs. mean sd p25 p50 p75 min max
BTP 30 102 0.0019 0.0003 0.0016 0.0018 0.0020 0.0011 0.0028
BTP 10 139 0.0018 0.0003 0.0016 0.0017 0.0019 0.0010 0.0030
BTP 5 132 0.0020 0.0005 0.0017 0.0020 0.0022 0.0012 0.0037
BTP 3 153 0.0017 0.0003 0.0015 0.0017 0.0019 0.0011 0.0027
CTZ 142 0.0013 0.0003 0.0011 0.0013 0.0016 0.0006 0.0021
BTP 10 ind 82 0.0019 0.0003 0.0017 0.0019 0.0021 0.0012 0.0029
BTP 30 102 10.65 1.06 10.07 10.75 11.34 7.07 12.44
BTP 10 145 19.26 1.56 18.61 19.43 20.33 13.71 22.26
BTP 5 134 17.02 3.07 14.59 17.18 19.76 8.18 22.21
BTP 3 154 13.77 1.36 12.94 13.95 14.65 6.80 16.28
CTZ 144 12.41 1.74 11.83 12.70 13.38 1.02 15.07
BTP 10 ind 103 8.78 0.73 8.38 8.79 9.21 5.07 10.52
absolute 
price 
change
market 
particip.
 
Note: The measures are calculated weekly as mean quote frequency, mean five-minute absolute price change and mean 
number of market participants of the on-the-run securities. “p” is the p-th percentile of the distribution. 
 
Table 6.10 – Comparison of Tightness Measures across Securities 
 
Note: The measures are calculated weekly as mean best spread, mean quoted spread, mean weighted spread of the on-
the-run securities. “p” is the p-th percentile of the distribution. 
 
# obs. mean sd p25 p50 p75 min max 
BTP 30 102 0.0062 0.0009 0.0056 0.0062 0.0069 0.0043 0.0082 
BTP 10 139 0.0031 0.0003 0.0028 0.0030 0.0033 0.0024 0.0041 
BTP 5 132 0.0053 0.0008 0.0047 0.0052 0.0058 0.0041 0.0101 
BTP 3 153 0.0071 0.0010 0.0065 0.0070 0.0075 0.0052 0.0128 
CTZ 142 0.0042 0.0010 0.0034 0.0039 0.0047 0.0026 0.0074 
BTP 10 ind 82 0.0125 0.0021 0.0114 0.0125 0.0140 0.0080 0.0172 
BTP 30 102 0.0102 0.0011 0.0093 0.0101 0.0108 0.0082 0.0124 
BTP 10 139 0.0061 0.0004 0.0058 0.0061 0.0064 0.0053 0.0071 
BTP 5 132 0.0101 0.0010 0.0094 0.0098 0.0109 0.0081 0.0138 
BTP 3 153 0.0142 0.0015 0.0134 0.0142 0.0148 0.0115 0.0243 
CTZ 142 0.0131 0.0021 0.0114 0.0131 0.0144 0.0089 0.0216 
BTP 10 ind 82 0.0235 0.0020 0.0228 0.0240 0.0249 0.0188 0.0272 
BTP 30 102 0.0098 0.0011 0.0089 0.0096 0.0104 0.0078 0.0123 
BTP 10 139 0.0057 0.0004 0.0053 0.0056 0.0059 0.0050 0.0067 
BTP 5 132 0.0093 0.0009 0.0087 0.0092 0.0101 0.0074 0.0118 
BTP 3 153 0.0135 0.0014 0.0125 0.0134 0.0140 0.0108 0.0227 
CTZ 142 0.0112 0.0017 0.0098 0.0110 0.0123 0.0080 0.0162 
BTP 10 ind 82 0.0239 0.0020 0.0232 0.0243 0.0253 0.0189 0.0268 
best spread 
spread 
weighted 
spread 
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Table 6.11 – Comparison of Depth Measures across Securities 
# obs. mean sd p25 p50 p75 min max
BTP 30 102 7.54 0.80 7.03 7.45 7.99 5.31 9.60
BTP 10 145 37.10 5.64 33.64 37.69 41.15 19.53 50.34
BTP 5 134 45.17 7.07 41.26 45.68 50.30 25.26 62.15
BTP 3 154 52.24 9.96 45.93 53.28 59.39 20.53 75.69
CTZ 144 10.28 3.87 8.40 9.96 11.23 5.73 48.25
BTP 10 ind 103 10.76 1.18 9.93 10.61 11.27 8.58 14.81
BTP 30 102 11.93 2.149 10.317 11.73 13.12 7.107 18.324
BTP 10 145 74.98 12.02 68.15 75.11 83.02 34.25 101.04
BTP 5 134 88.60 13.61 82.02 88.71 94.87 36.04 120.56
BTP 3 154 96.03 13.41 88.36 96.99 104.3 26.22 129.49
CTZ 143 12.61 4.14 10.12 11.99 13.94 6.56 28.12
BTP 10 ind 103 13.81 1.902 12.641 13.67 14.94 10.38 23.22
BTP 30 102 66.18 8.50 62.54 67.35 71.41 37.43 82.55
BTP 10 145 46.49 9.85 39.10 46.62 53.64 16.62 73.34
BTP 5 134 23.54 5.80 19.45 22.34 27.44 11.24 38.56
BTP 3 154 17.26 4.65 13.95 16.47 20.37 7.79 29.76
CTZ 143 86.58 12.76 79.16 85.32 94.71 29.58 124.81
BTP 10 ind 103 103.96 11.42 98.13 104.23 111.22 44.55 126.49
BTP 30 102 82.68 9.95 78.27 83.50 89.93 53.04 98.28
BTP 10 145 156.45 16.94 147.17 157.60 167.02 97.72 200.23
BTP 5 134 155.12 18.66 146.18 155.25 165.95 79.71 199.29
BTP 3 154 163.66 20.69 149.92 167.41 177.47 72.48 208.81
CTZ 144 107.95 17.68 98.67 108.70 117.31 9.62 170.49
BTP 10 ind 103 127.21 12.00 121.10 127.48 134.77 62.90 152.18
BTP 30 102 11.61 1.20 10.97 11.61 12.53 7.83 14.40
BTP 10 145 45.25 6.03 41.30 45.86 49.15 23.78 58.58
BTP 5 134 52.90 8.71 47.45 53.60 58.62 26.22 74.50
BTP 3 154 62.25 10.19 56.41 63.12 69.03 21.52 85.28
CTZ 143 10.59 2.07 9.36 10.36 11.58 6.78 21.36
BTP 10 ind 103 15.42 1.01 14.80 15.36 16.04 11.37 17.93
BTP 30 102 7.59 0.35 7.39 7.60 7.82 6.59 8.64
BTP 10 145 8.16 0.58 7.77 8.10 8.42 6.58 10.41
BTP 5 134 9.35 1.63 8.07 9.06 11.03 6.13 12.11
BTP 3 154 11.91 0.68 11.59 11.93 12.30 9.58 13.92
CTZ 143 8.92 1.08 8.17 8.80 9.63 6.79 13.32
BTP 10 ind 103 14.42 0.57 14.10 14.46 14.79 11.91 15.52
best size
second size
worst size
quoted size
average 
quote size
qtd size per 
participant
 
Note: The measures are calculated weekly as mean beast size, mean second size, mean worst size, mean quoted size, 
mean average quote size, and mean quoted size per market participant of the on-the-run securities. “p” is the p-th 
percentile of the distribution. 
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Table 06.12 Comparison of Breadth and Multidimensional Measures across Securities 
# obs. mean sd p25 p50 p75 min max
BTP 30 102 0.0042 0.0008 0.0036 0.0041 0.0048 0.0030 0.0062
BTP 10 139 0.0031 0.0003 0.0029 0.0031 0.0033 0.0022 0.0038
BTP 5 132 0.0050 0.0005 0.0046 0.0049 0.0052 0.0039 0.0066
BTP 3 153 0.0073 0.0008 0.0068 0.0073 0.0077 0.0056 0.0117
CTZ 142 0.0113 0.0023 0.0096 0.0108 0.0124 0.0072 0.0204
BTP 10 ind 82 0.0110 0.0017 0.0097 0.0106 0.0124 0.0075 0.0144
BTP 30 102 6.83 0.39 6.67 6.83 7.04 5.14 7.62
BTP 10 145 3.46 0.25 3.31 3.49 3.63 2.69 4.18
BTP 5 134 2.93 0.22 2.76 2.90 3.05 2.53 3.76
BTP 3 154 2.70 0.19 2.57 2.67 2.76 2.32 3.43
CTZ 144 10.13 1.39 9.47 10.27 10.82 0.72 13.31
BTP 10 ind 103 8.16 0.60 7.85 8.22 8.57 5.21 9.22
BTP 30 102 0.007     0.001 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.011
BTP 10 139 0.004     0.001 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.006
BTP 5 132 0.007     0.001 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.012
BTP 3 153 0.009     0.002 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.006 0.020
CTZ 142 0.014     0.003 0.011 0.013 0.016 0.008 0.029
BTP 10 ind 82 0.012     0.002 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.010 0.027
BTP 30 102 0.82 0.10 0.74 0.81 0.88 0.59 1.15
BTP 10 139 0.43 0.08 0.38 0.41 0.47 0.31 0.71
BTP 5 132 0.77 0.14 0.67 0.75 0.84 0.56 1.37
BTP 3 153 1.27 0.25 1.12 1.24 1.41 0.79 2.28
CTZ 142 7.49 1.89 6.00 7.16 8.90 4.22 11.75
BTP 10 ind 82 1.22 0.13 1.14 1.20 1.30 0.99 1.84
BTP 30 102 0.0125 0.0024 0.0109 0.0119 0.0138 0.0090 0.0206
BTP 10 139 0.0048 0.0012 0.0040 0.0046 0.0052 0.0030 0.0092
BTP 5 128 0.0072 0.0024 0.0055 0.0067 0.0077 0.0042 0.0171
BTP 3 153 0.0112 0.0059 0.0085 0.0097 0.0111 0.0058 0.0511
CTZ 142 0.0195 0.0052 0.0156 0.0189 0.0230 0.0103 0.0385
BTP 10 ind 82 0.0198 0.0032 0.0174 0.0199 0.0210 0.0153 0.0342
BTP 30 102 81.78 11.03 76.63 84.08 90.58 51.49 108.36
BTP 10 139 259.67 37.30 233.04 261.51 286.76 164.10 353.91
BTP 5 131 156.68 24.50 141.91 157.00 173.15 83.90 210.09
BTP 3 153 116.88 16.08 105.80 117.38 129.88 69.77 147.85
CTZ 142 86.40 20.12 70.44 82.26 101.37 42.15 136.66
BTP 10 ind 82 55.17 7.83 50.76 53.63 58.25 24.69 74.51
DS
DSS
Market 
Quality 
Index 2
steepness
slope
quote 
frequency
 
Note: The measures are calculated weekly as mean steepness, mean slope, mean DS, mean DSS and mean market 
quality index 2 of the on-the-run securities. “p” is the p-th percentile of the distribution. 
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Table 06.13 – Comparison of Trading Measures across Securities 
# obs. mean sd p25 p50 p75 min max
BTP 30 102 3.49 0.34 3.29 3.50 3.75 2.65 4.32
BTP 10 145 6.50 0.47 6.11 6.52 6.91 5.45 7.49
BTP 5 129 6.37 0.78 6.10 6.47 6.84 3.25 8.19
BTP 3 154 6.94 0.82 6.34 6.98 7.50 4.87 9.17
CTZ 143 4.00 0.81 3.53 3.84 4.29 2.81 9.70
BTP 10 ind 101 6.12 1.24 5.56 6.01 6.76 2.50 10.00
BTP 30 102 72.42 55.034 36.80 63.93 91.71 6.24 379.61
BTP 10 145 368.91 128.44 281.68 355.54 446.47 99.84 678.91
BTP 5 129 163.27 100.81 91.74 139.24 220.49 33.34 657.63
BTP 3 154 223.53 143.96 131.74 183.65 275.2 45.36 1086.43
CTZ 143 169.77 98.26 106.18 146.62 200.06 37.74 564.97
BTP 10 ind 101 62.97 44.770 30.232 54.22 79.09 5.08 238.05
BTP 30 102 19.90 16.38 10.06 16.66 24.94 1.67 134.47
BTP 10 145 56.60 19.70 40.88 55.17 68.69 16.38 106.41
BTP 5 129 26.39 18.29 13.83 21.63 36.95 5.40 125.95
BTP 3 154 32.59 22.31 18.20 26.20 39.16 6.48 193
CTZ 143 43.63 22.65 28.40 39.22 50.39 9.90 128.91
BTP 10 ind 101 9.99 6.95 5.20 8.57 12.62 1 37.28
BTP 30 102 0.55 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.61 0.04 2.63
BTP 10 145 3.36 2.20 1.81 2.61 4.25 0.55 12.65
BTP 5 126 1.44 1.43 0.62 0.93 1.88 0.19 11.36
BTP 3 154 2.22 2.94 0.92 1.39 2.36 0.28 27.16
CTZ 143 2.08 2.43 0.87 1.37 2.43 0.31 18.22
BTP 10 ind 101 0.56 0.52 0.21 0.42 0.65 0.04 3.51
BTP 30 101 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.004 -0.013 0.018
BTP 10 138 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.005
BTP 5 123 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.008 0.018
BTP 3 152 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.008
CTZ 140 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.005 0.013
BTP 10 ind 73 0.007 0.013 0.003 0.006 0.011 -0.072 0.039
BTP 30 101 0.010 0.014 0.004 0.011 0.017 -0.045 0.064
BTP 10 138 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.011 -0.011 0.031
BTP 5 123 0.016 0.019 0.006 0.014 0.022 -0.056 0.104
BTP 3 152 0.019 0.016 0.011 0.018 0.027 -0.026 0.059
CTZ 140 0.014 0.011 0.007 0.013 0.020 -0.015 0.055
BTP 10 ind 73 0.050 0.066 0.028 0.044 0.081 -0.179 0.244
NTQ
NTC
trade size
trading 
volume
trading 
frequency
turnover 
ratio
 
Note: The measures are calculated weekly as mean trade size, mean daily trading volume, mean daily trading frequency 
and mean daily turnover ratio of the on-the-run securities. NTQ and NTC come from the regression, using the on-the-
run sample, of five minute price changes on respectively the difference between buy and sell quantities and buy and sell 
number of trades as regressor. “p” is the p-th percentile of the distribution. 
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Table 06.14 Correlations of Market Condition Indicators across Securities 
BTP 30 BTP 10 BTP 5 BTP 3 CTZ BTP 10 ind
BTP 30 1
BTP 10 0.9732* 1
BTP 5 0.6644* 0.6963* 1
BTP 3 0.6961* 0.6473* 0.6527* 1
CTZ 0.6027* 0.4560* 0.5158* 0.7801* 1
BTP 10 ind 0.9527* 0.9565* 0.6455* 0.7595* 0.6986* 1
BTP 30 1
BTP 10 0.4675* 1
BTP 5 0.4466* 0.4473* 1
BTP 3 0.6289* 0.6311* 0.5675* 1
CTZ 0.4167* 0.4019* 0.4765* 0.4396* 1
BTP 10 ind 0.5629* 0.4903* 0.5361* 0.5562* 0.3955* 1
absolute 
price 
change
market 
particip.
 
Note: The table reports correlation coefficients for on-the-run securities. The measures are calculated weekly as mean 
absolute price change and mean market participants. The * indicates that the correlation coefficients are significant at 
the 5% level or better. 
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Table 06.15 Correlations of Order Book Measures across Securities 
 
Note: The table reports correlation coefficients for on-the-run securities. The measures are calculated weekly as mean 
absolute price change and mean market participants. The * indicates that the correlation coefficients are significant at 
the 5% level or better. 
BTP 30 BTP 10 BTP 5 BTP 3 CTZ BTP 10 ind 
BTP 30 1 
BTP 10 0.4930* 1 
BTP 5 0.2902* 0.4755* 1 
BTP 3 0.4140* 0.3791* 0.4547* 1 
CTZ -0.0518 -0.15 -0.3013* -0.02 1 
BTP 10 ind 0.0752 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.5577* 1 
BTP 30 1 
BTP 10 0.3759* 1 
BTP 5 0.3620* 0.3320* 1 
BTP 3 0.2508* 0.2893* 0.4401* 1 
CTZ -0.2991* 0.14 -0.13 -0.09 1 
BTP 10 ind 0.2036 0.5148* 0.04 0.12 0.2774* 1 
BTP 30 1 
BTP 10 0.5030* 1 
BTP 5 0.4477* 0.5100* 1 
BTP 3 0.4022* 0.6468* 0.4946* 1 
CTZ 0.2824* 0.5451* 0.2056* 0.3158* 1 
BTP 10 ind 0.1874 0.1613 0.2253* 0.2052* 0.3023* 1 
BTP 30 1 
BTP 10 0.2623* 1 
BTP 5 0.2598* 0.4695* 1 
BTP 3 0.3265* 0.6476* 0.4829* 1 
CTZ 0.4634* 0.4545* 0.2926* 0.4930* 1 
BTP 10 ind 0.1638 0.137 0.1864 0.2068* 0.3036* 1 
BTP 30 1 
BTP 10 0.3039* 1 
BTP 5 0.3250* 0.1281 1 
BTP 3 0.1581 0.2136* 0.2352* 1 
CTZ -0.1474 -0.1027 0.0049 -0.1116 1 
BTP 10 ind 0.7543* 0.3812* 0.1457 -0.0613 0.0928 1 
BTP 30 1 
BTP 10 0.183 1 
BTP 5 0.3965* 0.5117* 1 
BTP 3 0.3259* 0.2608* 0.2855* 1 
CTZ 0.3596* 0.1332 0.3716* 0.3221* 1 
BTP 10 ind 0.0138 0.4713* 0.4809* 0.21 0.3169* 1 
average 
quote size 
best size 
best 
spread 
spread 
DS 
steepness 
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Table 06.16 Correlations of Trading Measures across Securities 
BTP 30 BTP 10 BTP 5 BTP 3 CTZ BTP 10 ind
BTP 30 1
BTP 10 0.1248 1
BTP 5 0.2376* 0.0603 1
BTP 3 0.0661 0.1674* 0.2249* 1
CTZ 0.0064 0.0791 -0.0359 0.1682* 1
BTP 10 ind 0.0558 -0.0529 0.2145* 0.0399 0.0191 1
BTP 30 1
BTP 10 0.2121* 1
BTP 5 0.0584 0.0766 1
BTP 3 0.3481* 0.2496* 0.0158 1
CTZ 0.2756* 0.0069 0.1163 0.2727* 1
BTP 10 ind 0.0199 -0.0334 -0.0753 0.0604 0.114 1
BTP 30 1
BTP 10 0.2586* 1
BTP 5 0.0895 0.1428 1
BTP 3 0.4399* 0.2667* 0.0726 1
CTZ 0.2623* 0.1479 0.1591 0.3273* 1
BTP 10 ind 0.0959 0.0099 -0.1163 0.1429 0.1124 1
trading 
volume
NTQ
NTC
 
Note: The table reports correlation coefficients for on-the-run securities. The measures are calculated weekly as mean 
absolute price change and mean market participants. The * indicates that the correlation coefficients are significant at 
the 5% level or better. 
 
 
7. Exploiting the Liquidity Measures: The Benchmark Analysis 
 
In this section we use the proxies for liquidity to try to understand when a new issued bond acquires 
the status of benchmark. 
 
7.1. Benchmark Analysis 
Both in the literature and in the industry the concept of benchmark security has been defined in 
many different ways: “Benchmark means the most liquid security, which is therefore most capable 
of providing a reference point for the market”; equivalently, “benchmark are issues whose yield are 
widely followed as macroeconomic indicators and used for pricing related securities” (CGFS, 
1999); furthermore, benchmark “is the most recently issued security with a cumulative issue size 
over a certain threshold” (D’Souza et al., 2003). Other definitions state that “to define benchmark 
status one should focus directly on price discovery and regard the price discovery process as a 
purely empirical matter” (Dunne et al., 2002) or “a new bond becomes the benchmark issue when it 
has been traded more than the old benchmark for at least three consecutive days” (Alonso et al., 
2004). Among the definitions adopted in the industry we have: “The eligible bond universe, to the 
status of benchmark, includes bonds issued within the previous two years with principal amount 
outstanding of € 5 billion at the date of the latest "tap" or auction. Issues of an outstanding volume 
of € 3 billion may be listed if the issuer commits to tap it to € 5 billion within 180 days of the 
auction and supported by at least 8 System Participants” (EuroMTS web site); or “also called on-
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the-run or current-coupon issue or bellwether issue, […] the benchmark issue is the most recently 
auctioned Treasury issues for each maturity” (Bloomberg web site).  
 
The definition we are going to partially exploit in this analysis is the Alonso et al. (2004) one. In 
particular, we define as benchmark a new issue that has been traded more than the old one for at 
least five consecutive days. The day in which the security gains the status of benchmark is set equal 
to the first day of the series. This criterion is fairly general in that we do not assume a specific 
threshold on the size of the outstanding security. Hence we can compare directly different securities 
with a simple criterion. Moreover, it is more restrictive with respect to the Alonso et al. (2004) one 
because it requires a working week and not three days of higher trading volume for the new issue. 
In the following table we compare our definition with the EuroMTS one. In particular, the latter, in 
the Italian case, implies that a bond become benchmark as soon as it is issued. According to our 
definition a bond usually does not acquire the benchmark status as it is issued, but only with a 
certain delay. Figure 7.1 reports the difference in trading volume between on-the-run and off-the-
run 10 year BTPs. The dashed vertical lines correspond to auction days. While in the upper panel 
the difference seems to be persistently positive after the third auction, in the lower panel this holds 
before the second auction takes place. 
 
Figure 77.1 Trading Volume Differences 
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Note: The figure represents daily differences in the daily trading volume for the 10 year BTPs with maturity 02/15, 
08/15 and 08/16. The differences are computed subtracting the trading volume of the off-the-run securities to the 
trading volume of the on-the-run securities. The differences are computed in millions of euros. 
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Table 7.1 shows the average number of trading days and the corresponding number of auctions 
needed for an on-the-run issue to become the benchmark for its segment according to our criterion. 
The index linked bond is excluded from our analysis because of the high number of days in which 
the bond is not traded. Referring to the central part of the table, the average difference of days is 
increasing in the original maturity of the bond and is in general less than 30 working days. If we 
work out the difference not in terms of days but of number of auctions and consequently of 
outstanding quantity, this difference is in general less than one auction. This means that the 
Table 7.1 – Benchmark Analysis 
Security ISIN 
code
Diff. 
(days)
mean day 
diff.
Num. 
auctions
Average 
outst.
Diff. 
(days)
mean day 
diff.
Num. 
auctions
Average 
outst.
Diff. 
(days)
mean day 
diff.
Num. 
auctions
Average 
outst. note
BTP 30 393465 5 1 5 1 132 3
361838 12 1 12 1 20* 1 idem 6 - 11
371991 36 2 36 2 72* 3
384453 19 1 63 3 90* 4 idem 6 - 7
401958 21 1 21 1 21 1 idem 6 - 11
379959 7 1 7 1 7 1
387292 23 1 23 1 23 1
402629 23 1 23 1 59* 3 idem 6 - 10
411281 -2 0 53 2 53 2 idem 6 - 7
367423 11 1 11 1 94* 4 idem 6 - 7
380485 0 1 0 1 0 1 idem 6 - 10
387770 28 1 35 2 35 2
400812 -3 0 -3 0 -3 0 idem 6 - 10
408524 0 1 29 1 29 1 idem 6 - 9
369706 16 1 16 1 16 1 idem 6 - 10
383119 0 1 0 1 0 1 idem 6 - 7
392699 0 1 0 1 0 1
405105 0 1 15 1 15 1
7625
(3479)
4375
(750)
5207.75
(1180)
6832.75
(3325)
3250
(500)
8
(8.96)
3250
(500)
8
(8.96)
51
(35.7)
22
(10.1)
5125
(1315)
13
(12.39)
27
33
36
(24.68)
4974
(1226)
31
6437.5
6314
(3251)
4 days 5 days 6 days
BTP 10 (22.32) (2164)
BTP 5 (19.21)
1442007BTP 3
(17.02) (39.07)(447)(12.79)
CTZ 4(8)
3250
(500)
 
Note: Columns 3-7-11 report the difference in number of trading day between our criterion and the EuroMTS one. Columns 4-8-12 report for each maturity segment the averages 
of columns 3-7-11. Columns 5-9-13 report the difference in number of auctions, where 0 indicates the when-issue time period. Columns 6-10-14 report for each maturity segment 
the average outstanding in millions of euros. The last column reports a robustness check for the 6 days criterion. The* indicates that Difference (days) is influenced by the 
presence of a single day that is missing or of higher trading volume for the off-the-run security. Standard deviations are between brackets. 
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benchmark status is not acquired immediately, but usually we do not need to wait the first 
reopening, i.e. the second auction.  
 
This evidence for the Italian securities seems to suggest that the issue sizes are well suited. 
Conversely, since in many cases the benchmark status is achieved just a few days before the second 
auction, it may be the case that the expectation of a new issue has a positive impact on trade. 
Columns 6-10 and 14 report for each segment the average outstanding. This is increasing in the 
maturity. In order to check the robustness of the “5 days” criterion, the table also displays the 
number of consecutive days with higher trading volume for the on-the-run securities using different 
criteria. In particular, we investigate “4 days” and “6 days” criteria. It turns out that tightening the 
criterion, i.e. increasing the number of days, delays the moment in which the security become 
benchmark. The number of auctions and the average outstanding increase also. The 10 year BTPs 
seem to be more sensible to variations in the criterion. However, for this security in 3 cases out of 4 
the change from “5 days” to “6 days” criterion is affected by the presence of a single day of lower 
trading volume for the on-the-run issue with respect to the off-the-run. If we narrow the criterion 
further, in general we find no significant differences with the “6 days” criterion. The latter result 
confirms ex post the goodness of the choice of the “5 days” criterion.  
 
7.2.The Quote Measures’ Puzzle 
Given the results of the benchmark analysis we ask ourselves if we can extend this way of 
proceeding to variables other than the trading volume. As shown in the previous section, it turns out 
that, while, as expected, trading variables such as trading frequency and turnover show a clearly 
different pattern when we compare on-the-run and off-the-run securities, order book variables do 
not. In other words, we could expect that old securities trade at a higher spread and a lower depth, 
whatever measured, with respect to the new issues. Hence we should be able to identify when an 
on-the-run security achieves the status of benchmark in a consistent way with our previous analysis 
on trading data. This is not the case. In effect, the daily pattern of quoting variables is very erratic. 
This means that on some days the on-the-run securities trade at better conditions with respect to the 
off-the-run ones and on some others the contrary is true. We explained this occurrence by referring 
to market regulation. Market makers are subject both to the MTS Italy and to the Italian Treasury 
regulation. The former mainly concerns predetermined buckets of securities, the latter applies to all 
the traded securities. Since the Italian Treasury rules are somehow more binding, these are usually 
gone by and, as a result, there is no clear pattern in the quoting variables in the transition to the 
benchmark status85. Figure 7.2 reports the differences in the best spread by analogy with the 
previous figure. The pattern in the differences is erratic and, especially in the upper panel, the 
differences are often close to zero. 
 
 
                                                 
85
 As of April 2007, about half of the market makers are also Specialists and then they must obey to the Treasury 
regulation in order to maintain their status and participate to high remunerative operations. 
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Figure7.2 Best Spread Differences 
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Note: The figure plot daily differences in the best spread for the 10 year BTPs with maturity 02/15, 08/15 and 08/16. 
The differences are computed subtracting the best spread of the off-the-run securities to the best spread of the on-the-
run securities. Best spreads are daily mean and they are computed in terms of prices. 
 
This is consistent with our previous findings. In effect, at high frequency level, at a weekly level 
and in the comparative analysis we always found that order book data show small differences 
between on-the-run and off-the-run securities.  
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Appendix A: Data Filtering 
 
The raw dataset has to be filtered for two reasons: the presence of both negative bid-ask best 
spreads and outliers. Those drawbacks can be the consequence of some technical inconveniences in 
the procedure of data transfer from MTS to Italian Treasury. In the period 2004-2005 the number of 
records transferred to the Treasury is occasionally and marginally different with respect to the 
number of records in MTS data base. This generates cases of negative bid-ask spreads, which are 
inconsistent with the working of MTS platform. In effect, on MTS platform an ask proposal with a 
price smaller than the price of a bid proposal would be automatically executed. The same technical 
inconvenience could generate false outliers among the proposals. For false outlier we mean that bid 
(ask) quotes may seem to be too low (high) with respect to the other quotes in the same snapshot 
just because some records in between are missing. However, outliers could be the outcome of the 
behaviour of market makers as well.  
 
First our filtering procedure eliminates all the snapshots where a negative best spread is present. 
Secondly, outliers are filtered out using thresholds on the gaps between prices within the same 
snapshot. For instance if the gap between the best bid price and the second best price is above the 
fixed threshold, this price and all the subsequent prices are filtered out. The thresholds are chosen in 
a way that they cut the sample around the 95% percentile. However, especially during the hours 
characterized by a lower trading activity, i.e. before 9.00am, after 4.00pm and around 1.00pm, the 
sample includes snapshots with only one bid and ask proposal. We call these “unique proposals”. 
Obviously we cannot apply the gap threshold in this case; hence we set a second threshold which is 
equal to the maximum spread we observe in the other snapshots. The maximum spread is the 
difference between the higher ask price and the lower bid price. The days characterized by problems 
in the working of the platform and by the suspension of the market making obligations are also 
excluded from the sample. The day the Citigroup-episode happened, i.e. August 2nd 2004, along 
with the day preceding and following that date are excluded from the sample as well. Tables A.1 
and A.2 report respectively the effects of the filtering procedure on the original sample and the 
thresholds. The filtering procedure is worked out security by security. 
 
Table A.1 Filtering procedure’s output 
quotes Obligations' 
suspension
Bestspread < 
0 Gaps
Unique 
quotes Other total contracts
Obligations' 
suspension total  
BTP 30 1.13 0.004 2.81 0.04 0 3.99 BTP 30 0.71 0.71
BTP 10 0.51 0.16 5.19 0.02 0.005 5.89 BTP 10 0.51 0.51
BTP 5 1.28 0.06 4.85 0.01 0 6.20 BTP 5 0.79 0.79
BTP 3 0.80 0.04 3.58 0.01 0.18 4.61 BTP 3 0.70 0.70
BTP 10 ind 1.61 0.01 3.84 0.01 0.00 5.50 BTP 10 ind 4.14 4.14
CTZ 0.74 0.10 2.33 0.02 0.00 3.19 CTZ 0.86 0.86
 
Note: The figures in the table are percentage. The breakdown of the sample is in Table 5.1.  
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Table A.2 Thresholds 
Gap Max Spread
BTP 30 0.04 0.4
BTP 10 0.02 0.28
BTP 5 0.02 0.23
BTP 3 0.02 0.17
BTP10ind 0.06 0.42
CTZ 0.01 0.06
  
Note: The thresholds are measured in ticks. 
 
 
Appendix B: Formulae 
 
The signed variables represent mean values with respect to the i-th snapshot. For the sake of 
simplicity, the index i is usually ignored. ask(bid)pricek is the k-th best quote on the ask(bid) side of 
the book. The number of proposals on the ask(bid) side of the book in the i-th snapshot are nask(bid). 
Therefore, k = 1, 2, ....., nask(bid). ask(bid)qtyk is the quantity associated to the k-th best quote on the 
ask(bid) side of the book. The cumulative quantity from the first to the k-th position on the ask(bid) 
side of the book is given by ask(bid)qtycumulk ≡ ∑
=
k
j
jyask(bid)qt
1
. We divide the measures in two 
cathegories: Measures from quoting data and measures from trading data.  
 
Measures from quoting data  
• best spread ≡ bestaskprice – bestbidprice, 
where bestask(bid)price ≡ ask(bid)price1; 
• spread ≡ bidpriceaskprice − , 
where the bar indicates the average of the variable and the average is on all the quotes on the 
corresponding side of the book; 
• weighted spread ≡ i
n
i
ii
n
i
i bidweightbidpriceaskweightaskprice
bidask
∑∑
==
⋅−⋅
11
,  
where the weights are
)(
)(
)()(
bidaskn
i
i qtycumulbidask
qtybidask
weightbidask ≡ ; 
• quote size ≡ 
2
zeaskquotesizebidquotesi +
, 
where ask(bid)quotesize ≡ 
)(
)(
bidaskn
qtycumulbidask ; 
• best size ≡ 
2
easkbestsizebidbestsiz +
, 
where ask(bid)bestsize ≡ 1yask(bid)qt ; 
• second size ≡ 
2
easksconsizebidscndsiz +
, 
where ask(bid)sndsize ≡ 2yask(bid)qt ; 
• worst size ≡ 
2
zeaskworstsizebidworstsi +
, 
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where ask(bid)worstsize ≡ ∑
=
)(
3
bidaskn
j
jyask(bid)qt ; 
• average quote size ≡ 
2
zebidquotesizeaskquotesi +
, 
where 
)(
)()(
bidaskn
quotesizebidaskquotesizebidask ≡ ; 
• weighted depth 
2
haskwhgdeptthbidwghtdep +
≡ , 
where bid(ask)wghtdepth ( )∑= −+≡
)(
1 100*)()(1
)(askbidn
k k
k
priceaskbidpriceaskbestbid
qtyaskbid
; 
• quote size per market participant 
icipantsmarketpart
quotesize
≡ , 
where marketparticipants measures the number of market makers who expose a double quote 
in each snapshot; 
• steepness 
2
ssasksteepnessbidsteepne +
≡ , 
where bid(ask)steepness ≡ 
2
)()(
100*)()(
priceaskworstbidpriceaskbestbid
priceaskworstbidpriceaskbestbid
+
−
; 
• slope 
2
askslopebidslope +
≡ , 
where bid(ask)slope ≡ 
bestsizeaskbidquotesizeaskbid
priceaskworstbidpriceaskbestbid
)()(
100*)()(
−
−
; 
• DS 
2
DASDBS +
≡ , 
where DBS (DAS) ≡ ( )))(var(
)(,)(cov
k
kk
qtycumulaskbid
qtycumulaskbidpriceaskbid
  
• Deepspreadl = bid
l
ask
l kk
bidpriceaskprice −      for l = 2.5, 5, 7.5, 10, … 
where { }lqtycumbidaskkk kbidaskl ≥= )(min)(  
• DSS ≡ ( ))var(
,cov
m
mdeepspread m
, 
where m is a multiple of 2.5 and indicates the cumulative quantities at which deepspreadm ≠ 
deepspreadm-1; 
• market quality index = 
10000*
*
spread
midquotetesizeaveragequo
, 
where midquote = ( )
2
ii bidpriceaskprice + ; 
• market quality index 2 = 
10000*
*
spread
midquotequotesize
; 
• ( ) ( )cebestbidpricebestaskpriL
bidqtybidpriceIaskqtyaskpriceI
LCRT
bidask n
k
kk
bid
k
n
k
kk
ask
k
+






⋅−⋅
=
∑∑
== 11
2
, 
where  
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
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)(if1
1
1)(
kk
k
k
k
bidask
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qtycumulbidaskL
I  
• absolute price change = 1−− ii midquotemidquote . 
 
 
Measures from trading data 
• trading volume = ( )
100
* icecontractprtradesize
 
• trading frequency = #contracts concluded in the time interval 
• turnover ratio = 
dingouts
umetradingvol
tan
 
• net trading count = (#buy contracts −  #sell contracts)  
• net trading quantity = volumesellvolumebuy −  
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Appendix C: Tables 
Table C.1 – Price Impact Regressions (prices) [1] 
BTP 10 - on-the-run BTP 10 - off-the-run
mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4
NTC .00179633*** .00300138*** NTC .00242393*** .00525041***
NTQ .00023451*** -.00017471** NTQ .00029266*** -.0003819***
#buy .00161982*** #buy .00237672***
#sell -.00198601*** #sell -.00247228***
_cons -0.00013147 -0.00006703 -0.00016684 0.00023332 _cons -.00082145*** -.00079843*** -.00084869*** -.00073654*
N 16493 16493 16493 16493 N 14787 14787 14787 14787
Adj R 2 0.0253 0.0218 0.0259 0.0254 Adj R 2 0.0400 0.0335 0.0427 0.0399
BTP 5- on-the-run BTP 5 - off-the-run
mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4
NTC .00165581*** .00023421*** NTC .00114556*** .00199149***
NTQ .00023421*** -0.00006379 NTQ .00014448*** -0.00012161
#buy .00137219*** #buy .00139657***
#sell -.00196541*** #sell -.00093947***
_cons -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0003 _cons -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004
N 9110 9110 9110 9110 N 4795 4795 4795 4795
Adj R 2 0.0393 0.0335 0.0394 0.0401 Adj R 2 0.0179 0.0148 0.0184 0.0180
BTP 3- on-the-run BTP 3 - off-the-run
mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4
NTC .00115837*** .00151003*** NTC .00104192***   .0011513***
NTQ .00013797*** -0.00004927** NTQ .00012656*** -0.00001445
#buy .00101619*** #buy   .00107926*** 
#sell  -.00132328*** #sell  -.00100637*** 
_cons -0.00002 0.00004 -0.00004 0.00025 _cons 0.00002 0.00005 0.00002 -0.00004
N 12307 12307 12307 12307 N 5891 5891 5891 5891
Adj R 2 0.0593 0.0484 0.0599 0.0599 Adj R 2 0.0607 0.0553 0.0606 0.0606
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Table C.2 – Price Impact Regressions (prices) [2] 
BTP 30- on-the-run BTP 30 - off-the-run
mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4
NTC .00645885*** .01177103*** NTC .00573779*** .00658227*
NTQ .00147575*** -.00141641** NTQ .00140584*** -0.00022281
#buy .00470947*** #buy .00557165***
#sell -.00844888*** #sell -.00587237***
_cons -.00188333* -.00178245* -.0019427* 0.0014 _cons -.00337155* -.0034665* -.00337076* -0.0031
N 3527 3527 3527 3527 N 1611 1611 1611 1611
Adj R 2 0.0617 0.0491 0.0650 0.0649 Adj R 2 0.0461 0.0423 0.0455 0.0455
CTZ- on-the-run CTZ - off-the-run
mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4
NTC .00051526*** .00064672*** NTC .00034797*** .00043129***
NTQ .00007902*** -.00003076*** NTQ .00005876*** -.00002016**
#buy .00052232*** #buy .00035287***
#sell -.00050882*** #sell -.00034342***
_cons -0.00007 -0.00007 -0.00007 -0.00008 _cons 0.00004 0.00004 0.00004 0.00004
N 14826 14826 14826 14826 N 8072 8072 8072 8072
Adj R 2 0.0370 0.0219 0.0379 0.0370 Adj R 2 0.0476 0.0306 0.0484 0.0475
BTP10ind on-the-run BTP10ind on-the-run
mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4
NTC .00740692*** .00590956*** NTC .00498437*** .00431069*
NTQ .00101923*** 0.00022742 NTQ .00074193*** 0.00010938
#buy .00763031*** #buy .00356282**
#sell -.00712548*** #sell -.00593681***
_cons -.00193335* -.00185117* -.00193321* -0.00239 _cons -0.00245 -.00307077* -0.00251 -0.00037
N 1682 1682 1682 1682 N 390 390 390 390
Adj R 2 0.1969 0.1831 0.1975 0.1965 Adj R 2 0.1285 0.1193 0.1265 0.1295
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Table C.3 – Price Impact Regressions (yields) [1] 
BTP 10 - on-the-run BTP 10 - off-the-run
mod1 mod2 mod4 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4
NTC .00556687*** NTC .00827773*** .01736769***
NTQ .00073205*** NTQ .00100229*** -.00122471***
#buy .00502615*** #buy .00822709***
#sell -.00614619*** #sell -.00833062***
_cons -0.0002911 -0.00010347 0.00082848 _cons -.00278909*** -.00271521*** -.00286959*** -.00269682*
N 15600 15600 15600 N 13720 13720 13720 13720
Adj R 2 0.0253 0.0222 0.0255 Adj R 2 0.0381 0.0323 0.0403 0.0380
BTP 5- on-the-run BTP 5 - off-the-run
mod1 mod2 mod4 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4
NTC .01211389*** NTC .01015879*** .01708408***
NTQ .00170493*** NTQ .00128409*** -0.00099393
#buy .01009039*** #buy .01245334***
#sell -.01458467*** #sell -.00830205***
_cons -0.0015 -0.0006 0.0024 _cons -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0037
N 8792 8792 8792 N 4432 4432 4432 4432
Adj R 2 0.0390 0.0335 0.0398 Adj R 2 0.0183 0.0152 0.0187 0.0185
BTP 3- on-the-run BTP 3 - off-the-run
mod1 mod2 mod4 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4
NTC .01545527*** NTC .01711192*** .01953793***
NTQ .00182774*** NTQ .00207247*** -0.00032051
#buy .01345838*** #buy .01762377***
#sell -.01783078*** #sell -.01662439***
_cons 0.00024 0.00112 .00411767* _cons 0.00045 0.00085 0.00038 -0.00038
N 11745 11745 11745 N 5891 5891 5891 5891
Adj R 2 0.0580 0.0471 0.0586 Adj R 2 0.0618 0.0560 0.0617 0.0616
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Table C.4 – Price Impact Regressions (yields) [2] 
BTP 30- on-the-run BTP 30 - off-the-run
mod1 mod2 mod4 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4
NTC .00929107*** NTC .00878009*** .01115693**
NTQ .00212223*** NTQ .00213565*** -0.00062768
#buy .00681039*** #buy .00839777***
#sell -.012113*** #sell -.00909075***
_cons -.00277424* -.00262903* 0.0019 _cons -.0053145* -.00543772* -.00531986* -0.0047
N 3527 3527 3527 N 1543 1543 1543 1543
Adj R 2 0.0613 0.0488 0.0644 Adj R 2 0.0452 0.0408 0.0448 0.0446
CTZ- on-the-run CTZ - off-the-run
mod1 mod2 mod4 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4
NTC .01080011*** NTC .01126714*** .01289487***
NTQ .00164825*** NTQ .0019654*** -0.00039378
#buy .01103121*** #buy .01145072***
#sell -.01059124*** #sell -.01109639***
_cons -0.00093 -0.00097 -0.00136 _cons 0.00132 0.00131 0.00133 0.00099
N 14542 14542 14542 N 8065 8065 8065 8065
Adj R 2 0.0387 0.0227 0.0386 Adj R 2 0.0534 0.0367 0.0536 0.0533
BTP10ind on-the-run BTP10ind on-the-run
mod1 mod2 mod4 mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4
NTC .05511498*** NTC .03867193*** .03309337*
NTQ .00745932*** NTQ .00576182*** 0.00090572
#buy .05081192*** #buy .02791238**
#sell -.05987435*** #sell -.04588085***
_cons -.01929499** -.01722019* -0.01106 _cons -0.01789 -.02269709* -0.01836 -0.00213
N 1301 1301 1301 N 390 390 390 390
Adj R 2 0.1988 0.1761 0.1989 Adj R 2 0.1308 0.1217 0.1288 0.1317
 
